

In search of the unicorn? Interdisciplinarity in intellectual history

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to reflect on the identity of intellectual history as an interdisciplinary field. It begins by taking into account the pervasiveness of interdisciplinarity in academia, while questioning its meanings and the gap between its theoretical justification and practice. As a trend embraced by many scholars and institutions, the paper argues that interdisciplinarity deserves to be thematised more specifically, since the literature swings between a wide range of definitions and fierce criticisms. Interdisciplinarity has been understood as a mode of research that integrates bodies of specialised knowledge to create a sophisticated understanding of a topic, but this definition is still vague as to the way the object of study determines the purposes of interdisciplinarity. As regards intellectual history, this essay offers a non-exhaustive but representative survey that throws light on the different and often contradictory ways in which intellectual history has been conceived as interdisciplinary. The paper ends by suggesting a way of fleshing out the commonplace that intellectual history is “inherently interdisciplinary.” Following John Pocock and John Burrow, I take a pragmatic standpoint: to embrace interdisciplinarity whenever it helps us solve the problems that concern intellectual historians, and it help us navigate historical realities. And conversely, being aware that interdisciplinarity is not a good in itself, and it does not necessarily guarantee results that are historically accurate.

KEYWORDS

intellectual history; interdisciplinarity; methodology; Arthur Lovejoy; John Pocock; John Burrow

This paper takes on board the problems and the joys, the miseries and the excitement, that simultaneously derive from interdisciplinary research, in particular as it relates to the field of intellectual history. It is inspired by the recurrent cliché that portrays intellectual history as “inherently” interdisciplinary. Except for Warren Breckman’s article, the literature is still lacking on this topic.¹ I argue that the view of intellectual history as inherently interdisciplinary can be rightly maintained when focusing on its goals and aims. This pragmatic view urges us to embrace interdisciplinarity whenever it helps us solve the problems that concern intellectual historians, while warning us of unreflexively adopting interdisciplinarity as a trend if this could undermine a historically sensitive interpretation.

In the initial section, the paper explores the ways in which interdisciplinarity has been understood in academia generally. First, I show that it has been taken for granted as appealing and trendy; second, that it has been variously defined; and third, heavily criticised. I then adopt a definition that focuses on its performance and throws light on the interplay between interdisciplinarity and intellectual history. The second section explores some of the ways in which scholars have understood intellectual history as inherently interdisciplinary and I show that whether this is an underlying feature of intellectual history is far from clear. I discuss the views of a number of historians, such as Arthur Lovejoy, Donald Winch, John Burrow, and John Pocock, among others. In the third section I suggest that we should reflect on the purposes, ultimate ends, and goals of intellectual history, and critically ask why we need to be interdisciplinary. When seen in this light, I argue that in order to map ideas and past intellectual debates a certain degree of interdisciplinarity is unavoidable. In intellectual history, interdisciplinarity has to do with contemporary institutional designs and eclecticism only secondarily, and it is only when we pay attention to the methodological insights and purposes that we can locate a built-in interdisciplinarity.

I. Interdisciplinarity as a buzzword: definitions and criticisms

As interdisciplinarity has become a pervasive term and buzzword in academia, it has often been taken for granted, presented as an unqualified good. Its use has positive connotations, evoking modernisation, innovative research, and a way of overcoming the traditional boundaries of disciplines, which sometimes seem to be obsolete considering

the increasing complexity of research problems.² But interdisciplinarity also refers to a dissatisfaction, an implicit assessment about the shortcomings of specialised knowledge in academia. Against the inflexible map of boundaries between disciplines, interdisciplinarity is regarded as some sort of antidote, denoting reform, innovation, and progress. The urge for interdisciplinarity has had an impact on both the redesign of fields of expertise and its institutionalisation, from graduate and postgraduate programmes to academic units, such as departments or research centres.

Yet the term interdisciplinarity is commonly used, but not frequently thematised. As it appears in research proposals, articles, or titles of doctoral programmes, it frequently means a “watered-down eclecticism.”³ Sometimes, rather naively, it implies a relationship between disciplines, that is, “any form of dialogue or interaction between two or more disciplines.”⁴ Such a broad definition is far from being operative, and it is only a preliminary approach to what interdisciplinarity might mean in practice. The literature on the topic has defined interdisciplinarity in many ways, as a “methodology, a concept, a process, a way of thinking, a philosophy, and a reflexive ideology.”⁵ The first existing analytical attempt to define the term, which appeared in 1972 as a report on a conference organised by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), also refers to the different kinds of “interaction”, sometimes referring to “the communication of ideas”, methodological, organisational, or epistemological.⁶

When first presented with the idea of interdisciplinarity, it is difficult to object to the idea of bringing disciplines together to examine problems that are considered extremely complex. As Roberta Frank puts it:

Interdisciplinary has something to please everyone. Its base, *discipline* is hoary and antiseptic; its prefix, *inter*, is hairy and friendly. Unlike fields, with their mud, cows, and corn, the Latinate *discipline* comes encased in stainless steel: it suggests something rigorous, aggressive, hazardous to master; *Inter* hints that knowledge is a warm, mutually developing, consultative thing.⁷

The underlying idea is that while each discipline offers only a partial perspective of a problem, interdisciplinarity provides a more comprehensive picture. Seen in this light, interdisciplinarity could only be a valuable asset. As such, it is one of the most widespread values in academia nowadays, an ideal that unites a community.

Some critics have argued, however, that interdisciplinarity is “the most seriously underthought critical, pedagogical and institutional concept in the modern academy.”⁸ In a provocative article, Stanley Fish has pointed out that interdisciplinarity is either disorienting or merely impossible. It is disorienting, he argues, because it dynamites the entire structure of the academic curriculum, thus constituting a “revolution tout court.”⁹ Disrespecting boundaries is in itself a transgression of the status quo that, Fish believes, is unsettling and unproductive. It therefore poses an epistemological problem, since it questions received and established knowledge, meanings, skills, and methods. Moreover, it highlights what we ignore, which in the words of Fish, it is a “pedagogy of antiknowledge.” I would suggest that Fish’s sense of interdisciplinarity as disorienting can be seen as a Trojan horse that, although disguised in an appealing rhetoric, it dissolves the basic agreements that are required for any serious scholarship.

Fish’s second criticism, that interdisciplinarity is an impossible task, suggests the image of the unicorn to metaphorically illustrate this point. Being interdisciplinary, he states, “is not a possible human achievement. Being interdisciplinary is more than hard to do; it is impossible to do.”¹⁰ Redrawing the boundaries between disciplines and establishing new links between them would only create new frontiers that would in turn need to be overcome. Thus, it is not a liberating idea, but “it merely redomiciles us in enclosures that do not advertise themselves as such.”¹¹ Highlighting a paradox, Fish argues that boundaries can quickly become obsolete and inappropriate, even right after they have been newly established. Interdisciplinarity becomes parasitical, if at all possible.

A more sophisticated criticism comes from Jerry Jacobs, who argues that the perceived need for interdisciplinarity arises from a distorted picture of what disciplines are.¹² According to Jacobs, Fish’s criticism is based on a simplistic view of disciplines as stable and well-tidied entities. Disciplines are instead porous, contingent, and contested clusters of skills, methods, and vocabularies, with “substantial internal differentiation”.¹³ Jacobs argues that disciplines are not static, but dynamic, absorbing ideas and techniques from other disciplines and are therefore not isolated fields, but permeable, nearly alive entities.¹⁴ According to this view, interdisciplinarity already exists within disciplines, whether at methodological, theoretical, or institutional levels. In other words, Jacobs suggests that disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity are not as opposed in practice as one might initially expect, but rather complementary.

In replying to these criticisms, I suggest an operational definition that highlights a pragmatic aspect and will help us examine the role of interdisciplinarity in intellectual history. Klein and Newell have defined interdisciplinary studies as “a process of answering a question, solving a problem, or addressing a topic that is too broad or complex to be dealt with adequately by a single discipline or profession.”¹⁵ This definition suggests that, in view of a complex problem, interdisciplinarity helps us gain some knowledge that in turn explains and clarifies an issue. It should, ultimately, work in practice. Moran offers a similar definition, also highlighting the need to “advance fundamental understanding” or “solve problems.”¹⁶ These definitions point to the goals of disciplines as a way to assess the efficiency of interdisciplinarity. I argue that a pragmatic view that focuses on ultimate purposes is helpful to understand the interplay between interdisciplinarity and intellectual history.

But so far the question still remains about what kind(s) of problem(s) need(s) to be solved and what the ultimate question that concerns intellectual historians is. In other words, what does relevant knowledge look like, and what does it mean to advance our fundamental understanding in intellectual history? The literature is flooded with interesting views on this key question, particularly in the last few decades.¹⁷ The identity and purposes of intellectual history is a hotly debated topic which is far from being satisfactorily addressed in a paragraph. Despite disagreement, there seems to be a common ground on the rationale of the discipline shared by most intellectual historians. We advance an understanding, and gain pertinent knowledge, when present-day interpreters locate authors, debates, and ideas in their historical milieus. We get a better grasp of a text when we are able to map intellectual influences and explain the impact of an idea or particular dispute at a given time. According to our definition, “relevant knowledge” is determined here by the nature of the problem that intellectual historians address, and the efficiency of interdisciplinarity could be assessed according to whether it serves this aim. We will come back to this point below.

II. Interdisciplinarity in intellectual History: an inherent feature?

Interdisciplinarity has been systematically considered as an inherent feature, and probably one of the best attributes, of intellectual history, even if there is a general lack of interest or confusion about its meaning. The number of institutions and postgraduate programmes that embrace this ideal is also notable.

Donald Winch memorably noted that intellectual historians tended to be playing “away matches” when giving papers, meaning that they frequently have to defend their approaches in front of audiences that are likely to be sceptical.¹⁸ This tension could be explained by the fact that frequently intellectual historians use ideas, methods, and insights from disciplines other than history, such as philosophy, political science, linguistics, law, or economics. Intellectual history is here portrayed as a field that, crossing boundaries between disciplines, never fits properly within mainstream historical research and requires a defensive justification of its choice of topics and methods. Additionally, when it comes to disseminating research done by intellectual historians, audiences can be highly interdisciplinary, given that those interested in intellectual history are not only trained historians. The metaphor of intellectual historians as playing “away matches” highlights that the actual development and the conditions for the dissemination of research are marked by an interdisciplinary character.

The description of intellectual history as “inherently” and “intrinsically” interdisciplinary is a commonplace, as Warren Breckman has rightly noted.¹⁹ Breckman’s survey of this assumption begins with the father of the history of ideas, Arthur Lovejoy, who then declared that this emerging field aimed at establishing a new and improved way to attain historical knowledge, countering specialisation and isolation. Lovejoy promoted a “propensity to disregard academic fences”, which would result in a crossroads where different “historical disciplines” could meet.²⁰ Although the study of the history of ideas was, according to Lovejoy, already being practised within different disciplines, he argues that these studies were conducted in isolation, and therefore the history of ideas should “break down” the division between historical disciplines.

Breckman points out that Lovejoy conceived the history of ideas as a “bridge” between disciplines, or “as a kind of metadiscipline that studies the common core of *all* the disciplines.”²¹ According to Breckman, Lovejoy was inspired by the meetings of the “History of Ideas Club”, where participants from different disciplines debated historical interpretations. It would seem that Lovejoy’s club was highly experimental in the choice of topics, methods, and types of cooperation among disciplines. However, his view is far less flexible or ground-breaking than one might assume. A close reading of Lovejoy’s seminal editorial of the *Journal of the History of Ideas*’ first issue shows that his interdisciplinarity only applies to “historical disciplines.” Lovejoy does not include

all other disciplines, and nor does it include those sections of disciplines concerned with non-historical issues. To put it differently, Lovejoy's interdisciplinary history of ideas would, for instance, disregard areas of philosophy that are not concerned with the *history* of (philosophical) ideas, while it would also be blind about recent hybrid disciplines, like digital humanities and its benefits for historical studies. Instead, Lovejoy envisaged a supreme form of history made up of all existing partial histories, an antidote for perspectivism. While this kind of relationship between disciplines could still be useful, it is a limited and obsolete view of the topic. Nowadays, to continue using the same example, the cooperation between history of ideas and philosophy does not limit itself to offering a historical account of philosophical debates, while digital technologies, for instance, have opened possibilities for research. According to Lovejoy, interdisciplinarity was envisaged to counter specialised histories of ideas, while remaining, nevertheless, *history*. But today, interdisciplinarity implies in practice a creative cooperation that goes beyond this ideal.

A non-exhaustive list of examples that illustrates in what sense intellectual history has been conceived and described as interdisciplinary could continue with the teaching curriculum at the Sussex Centre for Intellectual History. The centre aimed at approaching history by bringing together the “cumulative professional achievements of individual disciplines.”²² John Burrow wanted to counter what he thought was a bias in the academic curriculum, that is, a tendency to take intellectual history as a synonym for history of political thought.²³ Pointing in the same direction as Lovejoy, Burrow's aim was to denounce the limitations of specialised knowledge, while suggesting a combination of efforts, a juxtaposition of successful, yet partial, histories.

Just as John Burrow thought that “the paraphernalia of disciplinary professionalism has always depressed [him],”²⁴ Stefan Collini later praised as a “sign of cultural health” that the institutional affiliation of the contributors to two volumes on British intellectual history “span several academic departments, including English, History, Politics, Law and Religious Studies.”²⁵ Therefore, a reader would have an interdisciplinary experience when approaching these volumes as a whole, given that each perspective adds to a holistic view. But the benefits are only manifest as an outcome, that is, as the sum of otherwise apparently mainstream disciplinary and partial perspectives.

In a volume on *Advances in Intellectual History*, published in 2006, the discipline is declared as a “supremely interdisciplinary enterprise.”²⁶ This collective monograph devotes several separate chapters to the relationship between intellectual history and

other fields such as history of political thought, literary studies, and history of science, among others.²⁷ While intellectual history enters into a dialogue with other disciplines, nothing in its methods or goals makes it inherently interdisciplinary. Needless to say, I agree that there is much to be gained from a collaborative perspective when studying the history of ideas, but we would better describe this as *circumstantial* interdisciplinarity, rather than inherent. Breckman also celebrates and encourages this eclecticism, seeing intellectual history as “a discipline where other disciplines meet [...], a busy intersection of a wide range of scholars and scholarship from other disciplines.”²⁸ Seemingly friendly to other disciplines, intellectual history displays, according to Breckman, a disposition towards engaging in a conversation with other fields. But strikingly, in this conversation, mainstream methods, skills, or jargon used within each discipline do not have to be necessarily altered at all.

The idea of a “busy intersection” could even lead to dissolving the identity of intellectual history. Seen in this light, it could be assumed to be an empty discipline made up of others, but nevertheless the container rather than the content. It would be a place where other disciplines meet, but it might be argued that the identity arises merely from being the combination of other disciplines. Rather than a character of its own, and beyond representing the crossroads itself, intellectual history could be charged with lacking purpose.

In a way, this view on the dissolution of the discipline would not be far from John Pocock’s position, although Pocock embraces the lack of identity as something unproblematic. In a collection of interviews, a range of intellectual historians reply to five key questions about motivation, originality, and future developments of both their work and intellectual history generally.²⁹ Significantly, one of the questions is: “what is the proper role of intellectual history in relation to other academic disciplines?” The topic and the phrasing of the question already tells us that this is a central issue for this academic community. While many contributors to the book argue that the role of intellectual history is to serve as a bridge between different scientific and scholarly fields, others praise its “interdisciplinary ambitions” and its “frank eclecticism” (104). Pocock’s reply is more provocative. He does not regard intellectual history as a single or “unified” discipline, since the label can also be “used to describe other programs of enquiry; but it does not bring them all together as a single discipline. Or rather: I don’t care whether it does or not”. Therefore, it is not “an academic discipline.”³⁰ As intellectual historians are concerned with “human beings thinking”, that is, “what they

do and what they think they are doing”, such an issue could be approached from different disciplines. The “dimension of subjectivity” would be a problem that a number of disciplines could attempt to solve. Pocock’s approach could result in the apparent dissolution of a discipline, but in my opinion it could also be seen as a problem-driven approach that considers issues of institutional design as having a secondary importance. He is concerned with a complex issue and it is superfluous whether this is a matter for a single or multiple fields.

III. Interdisciplinarity as subordinated to the aims of intellectual history

In the previous section I have surveyed different understandings of the interdisciplinary character of intellectual history. Interdisciplinarity has tended to be considered a positive feature, but its meaning and uses are diverse and sometimes contradictory. It seems that interdisciplinarity is usually a synonym for dialogue and cooperation among fields, a process of juxtaposing perspectives and accumulating knowledge beyond specialisation, although in a way that substantially does not alter conventional institutional designs, methods, or skills. Therefore, if this is the case, the alleged innovation and originality that we take for granted are simply inexistent. The list of authors discussed is far from being exhaustive, although it is representative of its contrasting uses. It would not be difficult to find more examples in the literature.³¹ My aim has been to show that, while having a uniform view on what interdisciplinarity means is not possible or even desirable, we do need to discuss this idea beyond the celebration of it being a central feature of intellectual history if we want to avoid the paradoxes discussed.

This section suggests a way to do so, by providing an interpretation of the topic that I have not so far found in the literature. It argues that, when considering the aims of intellectual history, interdisciplinarity is unavoidable. This demand for interdisciplinarity becomes apparent when we focus on the goals and purposes of intellectual history. My position is inspired by Burrow’s and Pocock’s views, who regard the problems that concern intellectual historians as the focal point. When trying to solve the problems at hand, I argue, interdisciplinarity is not a choice but a necessity. In this sense, I will argue, we should still maintain that it is an “inherently interdisciplinary field”.

Let me take up the argument I developed in the first section. If we agree that interdisciplinarity is “a process of answering a question, solving a problem, or addressing a topic that is too broad or complex to be dealt with adequately by a single discipline or profession,”³² then we would have to identify the kinds of problems that need attention in order to assess the conditions for interdisciplinarity. This is a question about why we need interdisciplinarity, if at all. Thus, the pragmatic view is that we should seek it at least when it helps solving the problems that intellectual historians face. Since ideas tend to migrate from one field to another, disrespecting boundaries, thus being interdisciplinary is often a natural and unavoidable condition for valuable research. In intellectual history, interdisciplinary objects of study should always lead to interdisciplinary methods and understandings, because the purpose is to explain how ideas were understood in the past. It is in this sense that we could still maintain its inherent interdisciplinary character.

Pocock’s and Burrow’s views seem to underpin this strategy. As discussed above, Pocock was concerned with solving the problem of subjectivity, which he believed was the most important issue for intellectual historians. This aim would sometimes lead him to disregard or even feel indifferent about disciplines and modern institutional designs.³³

John Burrow was similarly urging intellectual historians to focus on the “historical distance” as a key issue, then trying to overcome obscurity, ambiguity, fragmentariness, irony, etc. beyond an “academic division of labour”.³⁴ Both Pocock’s indifference and Burrow’s regret seem to encourage us to flexibly disregard boundaries whenever necessary to accomplish our goals.

Interdisciplinarity should therefore serve our purpose: help us locate authors, debates, and ideas in their historical milieus, map intellectual influences, and explain the impact of an idea or particular dispute at a given time. Since such a broad and complex problem cannot usually be dealt with in a single discipline, borrowing concepts, methods, skills, and insights from other disciplines is for many scholars not a matter of choice, but an indispensable strategy. In an attempt to understand the historical specificity of ideas, languages, or ideological debates that took place in the past, the conditions for interdisciplinarity are determined *in the first place* by the objects of study themselves. We should investigate the categories that the historical records bring about, and decide if, and in which way, we should be creative about methods and skills. In this view, interdisciplinarity is subordinated to the specific historical character of the

problem, and can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis. This could be labelled a bottom-up, or problem-driven, approach to interdisciplinarity. Historical records determine the conditions for interdisciplinarity, and not the other way round, in which interdisciplinarity tends to be either acquired as a fashionable trend, or a requirement for funding purposes.

A great number of practices and results could then be rightly described as interdisciplinary in intellectual history. But the crucial aspect would be to determine how different insights from a variety of disciplines serve the goals and purposes of intellectual historians, rather than attempting to be interdisciplinary for its own sake. The practice of interdisciplinarity requires us to enhance our interpretations and “advance our knowledge” not in any possible way, but in a way that leads to a historically sensitive interpretation. In other words, in intellectual history the choice of an interdisciplinary method cannot be divorced from its purpose without running the risk of anachronism and presentism. Interdisciplinarity for its own sake, that is, when it does not entail a methodological reflection, could possibly undermine the purposes of intellectual history. For instance, no matter how sophisticated methods might be, how innovative research and the use of new technologies, it could be the case that it does very little help us contextualise a debate and understanding its historical specificity. This strategy subordinates interdisciplinarity to our aims and carefully chooses the conditions for its practice. Ideally, interdisciplinarity should work in our favour. Otherwise, we can be faced with a paradox. A study can be interdisciplinary strictly speaking, combining insights and techniques from different disciplines, and still fail to enhance our understanding of the past in the way intellectual historians aim. To put it differently, interdisciplinarity is not good in itself, it does not guarantee results that are historically accurate, but it is particularly useful when it helps us navigate historical realities.

Arguably, this bottom-up or problem-driven approach might be complemented by other kinds of interdisciplinarity that do not prioritise the goals of intellectual history (which I have not discussed in this paper), but as such, a bottom-up criterion makes interdisciplinarity, understood as serving a historical understanding, an indispensable feature of the research on the history of ideas. I suggest that, contrary to Stanley Fish, who doubts the value or plausibility of interdisciplinarity, there is a very good reason for intellectual historians to carry on interdisciplinary research: it is not only possible, but also unavoidable. I argue that intellectual history is inherently interdisciplinary in

the sense that to reconstruct the conceptual and imaginative frameworks in which ideas made sense in the past we need to take boundaries between disciplines as provisional, being aware that these are historical constructs, and we are susceptible to crossing them at least whenever that helps us achieve our purpose. While it is not possible to dispense with the disciplines, it would be helpful to adopt a critical stance by being aware of the historical construction of knowledge and migration of ideas. If intellectual historians are to take contextualisation seriously, interdisciplinarity has to either help fulfil this goal, or at the very least to not undermine it.

Notes

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- ¹ Breckman, “Intellectual History and the Interdisciplinary Ideal.”
- ² Jacobs, “Sidebar: The Need for Disciplines,” 35.
- ³ Smelser, “Interdisciplinarity in Theory and Practice,” 55.
- ⁴ Moran, *Interdisciplinarity*, 14.
- ⁵ Klein, *Interdisciplinarity*, 196.
- ⁶ Berger, “Opinions and Facts,” 23.
- ⁷ Frank, “‘Interdisciplinarity’: The First Half Century,” 100.
- ⁸ Liu, “The Power of Formalism,” 734.
- ⁹ Fish, “Being Interdisciplinary Is so Very Hard to Do,” 17.
- ¹⁰ Fish, “Being Interdisciplinary Is so Very Hard to Do,” 19.
- ¹¹ Fish, “Being Interdisciplinary Is so Very Hard to Do,” 18. See this argument also in Hansson “Interdisciplinarity: For What Purpose?,” 340.
- ¹² Jacobs “Sidebar: The Need for Disciplines”.
- ¹³ Jacobs “Sidebar: The Need for Disciplines,” 35.
- ¹⁴ Jacobs “Sidebar: The Need for Disciplines,” 36.
- ¹⁵ Klein and Newell, “Advancing Interdisciplinary Studies,” 393.
- ¹⁶ Moran, *Interdisciplinarity*, 14.
- ¹⁷ Whatmore, *What is Intellectual History?* Collini, “The Identity of Intellectual History”; Brett, “What is Intellectual History Now?”. Bevir, “The Contextual Approach”; Grafton, “The History of Ideas: Precept and Practice, 1950-2000 and Beyond.”
- ¹⁸ Whatmore, *What is Intellectual History?*, 10. Also quoted in Young, “Introduction,” 1. See also Burrow, *Memories Migrating*, 180–1.
- ¹⁹ Breckman, “Intellectual History and the Interdisciplinary Ideal,” 275.
- ²⁰ Lovejoy, “Reflections on the History of Ideas,” 3–6.
- ²¹ Breckman, “Intellectual History and the Interdisciplinary Ideal,” 277. My emphasis.
- ²² Cuttica, “Intellectual History in the Modern University,” 38.
- ²³ Cuttica, “Intellectual History in the Modern University,” 38.
- ²⁴ Burrow, *Memories Migrating*, 181.
- ²⁵ Collini, “General Introduction,” 3.
- ²⁶ Young, “Introduction”, in *Palgrave Advances in Intellectual History*, 1.
- ²⁷ “This volume is centrally concerned with the complementary aspects of those disciplines that most clearly and fruitfully employ the techniques associated with intellectual history”, Young, “Introduction”, in *Palgrave Advances in Intellectual History*, 1.
- ²⁸ Breckman, “Intellectual History and the Interdisciplinary Ideal,” 11.
- ²⁹ *Intellectual History: Five Questions*.
- ³⁰ John Pocock’s Interview, *Intellectual History: Five Questions*, 144. His emphasis.

³¹ Warren Beckman's article contains more instances.

³² Klein and Newell, "Advancing Interdisciplinary Studies," 3.

³³ See above for Pocock's interview.

³⁴ Burrow, "Intellectual History in English Academic Life," 16, 14.

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