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Job Satisfaction and Preference for Public Employment

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Abstract
This paper aims to identify the factors why the working population declares its preference for public jobs. For this objective, we use microdata from a nationally representative Spanish survey and include overall job satisfaction and job facets satisfaction in the current job and information on work values as additional regressors to explain why employees prefer to work in the public sector. The main result of our estimates is that the satisfaction variables are significant factors explaining the preference for public jobs. The empirical evidence also shows that women prefer public jobs more than men, regardless of their professional situation.

Keywords Job satisfaction · Gender · Public employment · Logit model

Introduction

The extensive existing literature on preference for work in the public sector has focused mainly on the attitudes of those who have not yet entered the labor market (*pre-entry* level, Korac et al., 2018; Korac et al., 2020) and those who are already public employees (Hansen, 2014). In the latter case, the analysis seeks to identify the characteristics of the job that constitute holding forces towards that occupation and those that are repulsive (Moltz, 2017). Less attention has been given to the motivation of certain employees (salaried or entrepreneurs) to change their employment in the private sector to one in the public sector (Su & Bozeman, 2009). More gener-

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ally, no studies analyze the determinants of preference for public employment among private-sector employees.

On the other hand, during the last decades, the determinants and consequences of work satisfaction have been widely analyzed in Economics and Organizational Psychology. Thus, there are numerous studies linking subjective judgments of job satisfaction of the individual with sociodemographic and employment characteristics such as gender, age, educational level, salary, promotion possibilities, etc. (Judge et al., 2002; Levy-Garboua & Montmarquette, 2004; Clark, 1997; Clark et al., 1996). Numerous studies highlight job satisfaction as an explanatory factor of potential mobility (Gamero-Burón, 2009) and effective mobility (Freeman, 1978; Lévy-Garboua et al., 2007; Clark et al., 1998). There are also studies in which public service motivation is analyzed as an explanatory factor of job satisfaction (Naff & Crum, 1999; Bright, 2008; Su & Bozeman, 2009).

This study tries to identify the factors why the working population declares its preference for public jobs. To this end, it explicitly considers that the workers' declared satisfaction with their current employment (or with some partial aspects of it) contains information on the workers' preference for public employment. To our knowledge, no studies have yet analyzed the relationship between the individual's declared satisfaction in current employment and preference for working in the public sector.

In this regard, it might be interesting to interview those who are already workers, regardless of their professional situation, to express their preference for public rather than private jobs to investigate the determinants of that preference. In this case, the preference declared by workers is the assessment they make of their employment in reference to their conception of the ideal public employment. Such assessments can provide information about the public sector's ability to attract qualified employees. Moreover, that preference is also related to antecedents of effective labor mobility, such as on-the-job search.

To understand why individuals choose public employment, the literature on personnel management considers that Public Sector Motivation (PSM) is the main reason explaining attraction to public sector employment (Bright, 2007; Perry & Wise, 1990). According to this approach, PSM is directly connected to the preference for public work (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008; Perry et al., 2010; Brewer & Selden, 1998; Vandenabeele, 2008). Along with this view, another line of research indicates that public employees may have a greater desire to produce public goods and services (Bellante & Link, 1981; Wright, 2001; Lewis & Frank, 2002). However, to explain the preference for the public sector, it seems relevant to consider other aspects such as the individual preference for job stability, the importance given to wages, or good organization of work time. At least in Spain, jobs in the public sector are generally seen as stable jobs, with schedules that favor work-family reconciliation and, in many cases, free from highly stressful situations. On the contrary, they are considered to offer lower remuneration and promotion opportunities than those provided by jobs in the private sector that require equal qualifications (Garcia-Crespo, 2001). The literature has also indicated that public sector workers may be more risk-averse than private sector workers (Anandari & Nuryakin, 2019; Said, 2011).

With few exceptions, the literature has considered the study of preference for public work in a single-country context. Relatively few studies examine the issue with international data or regional information. These latest studies conclude that employment preferences are a function of individual attitudes, sociodemographic characteristics and the context of the country or region, including its economic health and the quality of public institutions (Moltz, 2017)[1] The current system of public employment recruitment is also a relevant factor, finding evidence that in countries with a career-rather than a position-based system of public employment, people are more likely to prefer public employment (Van de Walle et al., 2015).[2].

For some reason, the study of preference for public employment is particularly relevant in Spain. Concerning the rest of the OECD economies, the Spanish economy has an average size with a public sector of high relative weight (almost 20% in 2022), being employment one of the fundamental pillars on which the country's economy is based. At the same time, that economy is also characterized by a high rate of temporary employment. Thus, in recent decades, this rate has rarely fallen below 25% of the total, and when it reduced, it has been because this type of employment has been destroyed. After unemployment, this is undoubtedly the fundamental problem of the Spanish labor market. In relation to this, Gamero-Burón (2007) also documents a negative relationship between temporality and satisfaction with current employment. Therefore, public employment can be a guarantee against unwanted temporality.

This paper presents empirical evidence on the relationship between preference for public jobs and declared overall job and job facets satisfaction and work values. This study expands the literature on the preference for public jobs in four respects. First, it presents a theoretical model that connects the preference for public employment with the declared job satisfaction, considered the employment as a whole and also considering some partial aspects of it. Second, it uses microdata from almost 25,000 workers residing in Spain provided by the Quality of Work Life Survey for the period 2007–2010 (pooling) to estimate logit models using different responses of satisfaction of workers with respect to current employment as leading indicators of preference for work in the public sector. Third, the study includes both public and private sector employees and employers (with and without contract workers). Fourthly, it adopts a gender approach, that is, a separate analysis is carried out for men and women to detect a possible significant gap by gender in preferences towards public employment.

The article is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical model that is the basis for our estimates. Section 3 presents the econometric specification of the estimated models while Sect. 4 describes the data and variables used in the analysis. Section 5 shows the results of the logit model estimates for the whole sample of

[1] This would justify including the regional unemployment rate or time controls to explain the preference for public employment if data from a country over a series of years and with regional information are used.

[2] As indicated by OECD (2008), "a career-based system is characterized by competitive selection early in the public servants' career with higher-level posts open to public servants only. Career-based systems may cultivate a dedicated, experienced group of civil servants. In contrast, in a position-based system, candidates apply directly to a specific post and most posts are open to both internal and external applicants".

employed workers and by occupational situation and gender. Finally, Sect. 6 contains the most relevant conclusions.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical model presented in this section allows us to connect preference for public employment and declared satisfaction in the current employment. For it, the model proposed is based on two general assumptions regarding employment. The first one refers to the nature of any job. Following the hedonic approach (Lancaster, 1966), it is assumed that a job is not only a salary and a number of working hours, but there are also other factors relevant to its definition, such as job stability, the organization of working time, the type of tasks, the conditions of the physical and human environment in which it takes place, etc.[3] On the other hand, since a job is not immutable, its definition also integrates the dynamics of its characteristics, both observed after a period of experimentation and the expected one.

The second hypothesis of the model is that, behind the declaration of preference for the public sector made by the employed individual, there is an *ex-post* assessment of the job currently occupied with respect to a public job that is "ideal", in the sense that it is only present in the employee's mind. Such reference employment contains the characteristics of what the individual considers to be "good" public employment for himself. The set of information that allows individuals to shape this image is composed of their own work experiences, those observed in or transmitted by other subjects, and the expectations in terms of employment. In this context, the declared preference for public employment is a relative judgment, since it arises from the implicit comparison between the current employment situation and an ideal situation, which would be experienced with ideal public employment.

Since the judgment is *ex-post*, emphasis is placed on the fact that the experiences lived by workers in their current job are important for the evaluation they make. In fact, it is assumed that individuals confront the complete career path (the past and the future one) associated with their current employment, with the hypothetical job that would result from occupying their ideal public employment during all that time.

From a formal point of view, we assume that the employment occupied by individual i, (e_i), is described by K components or facets:

$$e_i = \{z_{i,k}\}_{k=1,\ldots,K} \tag{1}$$

According to the definition of employment given above, with each of these components, the worker summarizes the past, present and future results in relation to a certain facet k of employment. Every worker is supposed to have an ideal public job (e_i^P) that is represented by:

[3] The perspective adopted here makes us radically separate from the *theory of compensatory differences* (Rosen, 1986), which models a balance between supply and demand of labor, so that wages play a central role as a corrector of inequalities in the non-wage dimensions of employment.

$$e_i^P = \{z_{i,k}^P\}_{k=1,\ldots,K} \tag{2}$$

It is also assumed that individual *i* has some idea about the levels of utility that jobs provide, and in particular, e_i and e_i^P. In the case of ideal public employment, experimentation occurs at the mental level. Under these conditions, the subjective occupational well-being that the worker experiences with respect to ideal public employment (SW_i^P) can be defined as the difference between the utility associated with these two jobs, i.e.:

$$SW_i^P = U(e_i) - U(e_i^P) \tag{3}$$

where $U(\cdot)$ symbolizes the utility function of work. This utility corresponds to the notion of *utility experienced* in the sense of Kahneman et al. (1997), as a consequence of the fact that the temporal element (past and future) is incorporated into the definition of employment. The expression emphasizes the importance of the utility differential experienced on the level of well-being the individual achieves at work.

In this context, the declared preference for the public sector that individual *i* expresses $(PSP_i)$is interpreted as a dichotomous indicator of that variable SW_i^P, that is unobservable:

$$PSP_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } SW_i^P = U(e_i) - U(e_i^P) \leqslant 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } SW_i^P = U(e_i) - U(e_i^P) > 0 \end{cases} \tag{4}$$

Thus, the worker's preference for public employment is understood as the result of a comparison of the utilities provided by the two jobs, the current and the ideal public. An overall negative result of this comparison will lead to the declaration of preference for public employment. This idea aligns with that expressed by Kilpatrick et al. (1964) in pointing out that workers normally perceive occupations and labor organizations not accurately but in terms of vaguely generalized cultural prejudices. Thus, individual preferences for public works reflect not only the priorities of one's job but their perceptions of which sector will best meet needs.

Our interpretation of the preference for public employment as an *ex-post* preference index is basically the same that underlies the model of Lévy-Garboua & Montmaquette (2004) for overall job satisfaction. Thus, if e_i^* is the general ideal employment of the worker, which may or may not be public employment, then:

$$U(e_i{}^*) \geqslant U(e_i^P) \tag{5}$$

so $\delta_i{}^P$ can be defined as the utility differential between general ideal and public ideal jobs:

$$\delta_i{}^P = U(e_i^*) - U(e_i{}^P) \tag{6}$$

By clearing $U(e_i^P)$ of (6) and substituting it in (3), an alternative expression for the subjective welfare ($SW^P{}_i$) is obtained:

$$SW_i^P = U(e_i) - U(e_i^P) = U(e_i) - \left[U(e_i^*) - \delta_i^P\right] \\ = U(e_i) - U(e_i^*) + \delta_i^P = SWT_i^* + \delta_i^P \tag{7}$$

where SWT_i* is the subjective welfare of the jobs that the worker *i* experiences defined as the utility differential between the current employment (e_i) and the worker's general ideal employment (e_i^*):

$$SWT_i^* = U(e_i) - U(e_i^*) \tag{8}$$

And this well-being is closely related to judgments of overall job satisfaction, as literature has pointed out (Lévy-Garboua & Montmarquette, 2004; Gamero-Burón, 2007). In this way, Eqs. (4) and (8) allow us connect preference for public job and observed job satisfaction. For its part, the second component of subjective well-being associated with public employment is ${\delta_i}^P$, already defined in (6).

Using the two mentioned components of subjective well-being associated with public employment, the revealed preference of worker *i* for employment in the public sector can be alternatively expressed as:

$$PSP_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } SWT_i^* + \delta_i^P \leqslant 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } SWT_i^* + \delta_i^P > 0 \end{cases} \tag{9}$$

Thus, worker *i* will declare that he prefers public employment ($PSP_i = 1$) if the sum of the two components of subjective welfare is less than or equal to zero and will declare that he does not prefer it otherwise.

Therefore, Eqs. (4) and (9) are two equivalent ways of defining the preference declared by public employment by workers ($PSP_i = 1$). However, in (9) the subjective welfare of work (SWT_i^*) determines such a preference and, according to the previously mentioned papers (Lévy-Garboua & Montmarquette, 2004 and Gamero-Burón, 2007), is also linked to the judgments of overall job satisfaction. In consequence, for the next empirical analysis, it makes sense to include the worker's declared satisfaction with his current employment or with partial aspects of it as factors affecting his declared preference for public employment, although the sign of this relationship cannot be advanced.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the case of those workers who are already public employees is different from that of workers in the private sector and deserves special mention. These public workers are already experiencing such employment, so their stated preference for public employment would imply a reaffirmation or not of a job option made prior to the time of the survey (*posterior choice*). In this case, moreover, the experimentation of ideal public employment is more lived than mental. For that reason, two predictions emerge. First, it would be expected that the preference for public employment would be higher among public sector wage earners. Second, the vectors of characteristics of general ideal employment and public ideal employment will be close. This means that the preference for public employment of these workers is more closely linked to the declarations of overall job satisfaction than in the case of other workers.

Econometric Specification

The theoretical framework set out above expresses the preference of the individual *i* for the public sector (PSP_i) as a dichotomous variable that is the result of the values that take for that individual two unobservable or latent variables (Eq. 9). The first latent component, $SWT_i^* = U(e_i) - U(e_i^*)$,corresponds to the overall subjective well-being of job and is linked to the overall job satisfaction declared by the worker:

$$SWT_i^* = \vartheta_0 + \vartheta_1(sat\_overall_i) + \xi_{1i} \tag{10}$$

where ξ_{1i} is a random perturbation, independent and identically distributed between individuals according to an $N(0, \sigma^2)$ distribution.

On the other hand, assuming that welfare SWT_i^* is a linear function of a set of utility differentials over different facets of current job, that welfare could also be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} &SWT_i^* = U(e_i) - U(e_i^*) = \\ &= \gamma_0 + \gamma_1[U_1(z_{i1}) - U_1(z_{i1}^*)] + \gamma_2[U_2(z_{i2}) - U_2(z_{i2}^*)] + \cdots + \gamma_K[U_K(z_{iK}) - U_K(z_{iK}^*)] \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

where the term $U_k(z_{ik}) - U_k(z_{ik}^*)$with $k=1,\ldots, K$, indicates the relative quality offered by the characteristic *k* of the job currently occupied by subject *i*, z_{ik}, in relation to the same characteristic *k* of the ideal employment, z_{ik}^*. Each parameter γ_k reflects the proportion in which the utility differential of characteristic *k* (between current and ideal employment) contributes to the overall subjective well-being of work. If the utility differentials present in (11) are denoted by v_{ik}, the latent variable SWT_i^* that will determine the declared job satisfaction variable is given by:

$$SWT_i^* = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 v_{i1} + \gamma_2 v_{i2} + \cdots + \gamma_K v_{iK} + \xi_{1i}' = \gamma' \mathbf{v}_i + \xi_{2i} \tag{12}$$

where ξ_{2i} is a random perturbation, independent and identically distributed between individuals according to an $N(0,\sigma^2)$, where $\boldsymbol{v}_i$ and $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$ are vectors that collect, respectively, the explanatory variables of well-being SWT_i and their associated parameters. Some important characteristics of a job, whose subjective assessment is included in vector $\boldsymbol{v}_i$, are the level of job stability offered by the job, the level of income it provides, the activity carried out itself, and the organization of working time. Making this explicit, the latent variable can be expressed SWT_i^*alternatively to (10) as:

$$SWT_i^* = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1(sat\_estab_i) + \gamma_2(sat\_income_i) + \gamma_3(sat\_activity_i) + \gamma_4(sat\_schedule_i) + \xi_{2t}' \tag{13}$$

where *sat_estab*, *sat_income*, *sat_activity* and *sat_shedule* are variables that reflect the degree of satisfaction declared by the worker with respect to the aforementioned four facets of job (stability, income, activity and schedule), respectively. The coefficient γ_k with $k=1,\ldots,4$, represents the weight of the satisfaction variable *k* on the overall labor well-being. The underlying hypothesis is that individual *i* bases his judgment about a particular job characteristic on the comparison between the util-

ity he obtains from his employment in relation to that characteristic and that which would provide his "ideal" employment.[4]

As we have seen, the component SWT_i^* of the public employment preference index of Eq. (9) is explained by variables of job satisfaction. The second unobservable component of ourPSP_i preference index is ${\delta_i}^P$. This component captures the difference in utility between the two ideal jobs, the general and public. It is interpreted that this differential can be explained both by job and the worker's characteristics. The latter would be the case for its risk aversion or the value placed on each facet of the job occupied, including leisure opportunities (Anandari & Nuryakin, 2019; Said, 2011).

Thus, to explain the component ${\delta_i}^P$ a linear model is specified:

$$ {\delta_i}^P = \beta' \mathbf{x_i} + \xi_{3i} \tag{14} $$

where $\mathbf{x}_i$ is the vector that collects the explanatory variables, β gathers the associated parameters and ξ_{3i} is an error term, independent and identically distributed among individuals according to an $N(0,\sigma^2)$. Replacing in (7) the assumed expressions for the components SWT_i^* (Eq. 12) and δ_i^P (Eq. 14) the welfare associated with preferring public employment can be expressed as:

$$ SW_i^P = SWT_i^* + \delta_i^P = \gamma' \mathbf{v}_i + \xi_{2i} + \beta' \mathbf{x_i} + \xi_{3i} = \gamma' \mathbf{v}_i + \beta' \mathbf{x_i} + \xi_i \tag{15} $$

where the set of regressors include in alternative specifications the overall job satisfaction or the valuations that the worker makes of the facets of his job and the term error, which is now compounded, is given by:

$$ \xi_i = \xi_{2i} + \xi_{3i} \tag{16} $$

The variable observed with respect to the preference for work in the public sector is dichotomous, in particular, it takes the value 1 if the worker declares such preference and 0 if he does not declare it. This characteristic determines the econometric methodology to be applied. In particular, the subsequent econometric analysis is based on a type of model specially designed to treat this class of discrete choice data, namely the *logit* model (Greene, 2003).

Data and Variables

Within the Spanish statistical panorama, the Quality of Work Life Survey (ECVT) developed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Issues of Spain is the only statistical source that contains the necessary information to estimate the model previously detailed. This cross-sectional statistical operation aims to obtain data on the situations and activities that occur at work and on the personal perceptions that workers have of

[4] A similar interpretation of the information provided by subjective assessments of employment characteristics can be found in Van Ophem (1991).

their working conditions and relationships, as well as satisfaction with their work. Its geographical scope is the entire national territory, except for the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, while the study population is delimited by subjects aged 16 and over, who reside in family homes, and who exercised some work activity, employed or self-employed during the week prior to the interview. For this research, data corresponding to the years 2007 to 2010 have been used, being 2010 the last year in which this survey was carried out. For the present study, employees in the public and private sectors and employers with and without dependent employees have been selected. Workers aged 65 or older, immigrant workers and those seeking employment from their employment at the time of the survey have been ruled out.[5] Once these filters are applied, the final sample is composed of 24,994 employed individuals.

The ECVT questionnaire surveys all workers to indicate their preference or not for work in the public sector, so the responses provide the data for the variable called *PSP* in our modelling. The ECVT also provides information on the different characteristics of workers and their jobs and on their satisfaction assessments of some facets of work. The variables selected as regressors in the estimates are detailed below, grouped according to the characteristics of those they report:

a) Sociodemographic characteristics.

- Sex.
- Age and age squared.
- Family situation with respect to occupation: employed partner, non-occupied partner (reference: no partner).
- Number of children according to age groups.
- Presence of dependents in the home.
- Educational level: Compulsory Secondary education, First-Degree Vocational Training, Second-Degree Vocational Training, Post-Compulsory Secondary education, Higher Education 3-year degree, Higher Education 5-year degree (reference: primary studies or lower).

- b) Work values. Respondents answer the question "To what extent would the following motives influence a hypothetical decision to change their current job for another?" [6]Increased stability.
- Salary improvement.

[5] Immigrant workers have been ruled out for the analysis because of existing legal limitations on their access to public employment. On the other hand, as will be indicated below, the interpretation of the questions that reflects the reasons why the worker would change jobs is different for individuals who combine their work with prospective activities in the labor market. This has led to them being discarded from the final sample. The sample corresponding to the year 2006 has also been discarded because the response scales to these questions changed from that year onwards, being the homogenization of the scales unfeasible.

[6] From the answers given to each of these four aspects on a scale of 0 to 10 it has been generated four dichotomous variables so each of them takes the value 1 to collect that this particular aspect would have "a lot of influence" in the hypothetical decision to change employment (answers 8–10 on the original scale) and 0 in the case that it has "little influence (answers 0–7 in the original scale).

- Change of activity.
- Improved schedule.

- c) Job characteristics.[7]Monthly working hours.
- Very satisfied with:

  work as a whole.
  stability.
  salary.
  the activity carried out.
  the schedule.

- Work is stressful.
- Work is physical.
- Work is monotonous.
- Job tenure (years).
- The training adjustment with respect to the job: overtrained, undertrained and other training different from that required (reference: correct training).
- Activity of the firm: agriculture, construction, commerce, hospitality, education, another service sector (reference: industrial).
- Professional situation: wage earner in private sector, entrepreneur with employees, entrepreneur without employees, wage earner in public sector.

d) Context variables:

- Size of the city of residence.
- Regional unemployment rate.[8]
- Year of survey[9]

Table 6 included in the Annex shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables involved in the analysis.

[7] In the survey used, workers respond to the variables of satisfaction with their job or with its facets and those related to the type of work (stressful, physical and monotonous) on a scale of 0 to 10. For the estimates, the corresponding binary variables have been generated so that they take the value 1 when individuals respond from 8 to 10 on the original scale and with the value 0 when the response is between 0 and 7 on the original scale.

[8] The unemployment rate might affect the preference for public jobs as an indicator of the macroeconomic situation in each region. This analysis is interesting because not detecting any effect of this variable would indicate that the preference for public work is not something in the short term but a permanent or long-term preference.

[9] Both the unemployment rate and the variables that reflect the survey year can reflect the economic cycle.

Empirical Results

Table 1 shows for the whole sample the percentage of employed people who prefer to work in the public sector. They have been classified according to their professional status and gender. Several interesting questions emerge. In the first place, 57.8% of all employed men declare public employment as the preferred one in a hypothetical change of employment compared to 62.4% for women. Secondly, by far and as predicted, it is public sector employees who show a greater preference for public employment. In addition, whatever the professional situation, women declare a greater preference for this type of job than men, reaching the percentage of preference of 88.9% for employees in the public sector.

Table 2 shows, first, the proportion of workers satisfied with their employment considered globally and with different facets of it, according to professional situation and gender. As far as the overall measure is concerned, it is employers with employees who place the highest value on their jobs, followed by employees in the public sector. This occurs for both men and women. By facet, women express similar levels of satisfaction with job stability and labor income as men, although in the latter case the figures for women entrepreneurs with employees stand out as relatively high. By occupational status, employers with workers and public sector employees of both sexes are most satisfied.

The last rows of Table 2 collect information on four hypothetical reasons for which respondents would be willing to change jobs. They approximate work values and correspond to the facets already valued by workers in terms of satisfaction. This allows us to obtain evidence on how important these facets of jobs (or labor values) are for workers. For instance, 53% of salaried women in the private sector consider that increasing labor income would be a very influential reason to change jobs. Inspection of the table reveals at least three facts. First of all, and in general, the most frequently mentioned reason, whatever the professional situation, is related to the increase in labor income. Secondly, the private sector wage earners give greater weight to almost all facets of work. Finally, employers with employees support to a lesser extent that stability is a determining factor for the job change.

Below are the results of the different estimates to explain the preference for public employment in Spain. Table 3 shows the marginal effects of the logit models estimated for the complete sample and by occupational situation. Looking at the results for the whole sample, it is clear what was observed in the descriptive analysis

Table 1 Preference for public job by professional situation and gender

	Total		Men		Women	
Professional situation	%	N	%	N	%	N
(1) Wage earner in private sector	54.6	14,702	48.7	5806	58.4	8896
(2) Entrepreneur with employees	45.5	1329	39.3	356	47.8	973
(3) Entrepreneur without employees	50.7	3192	45.5	1053	53.3	2139
(4) Wage earner in public sector	84.4	5771	80.7	3150	88.9	2621
Workers in private sector [(1) to (3)]	53.3	19,223	47.8	7215	56.6	12,008
All workers [(1) to (4)]	60.5	24,994	57.8	10,365	62.4	14,629

Source: Authors' calculations based on ECVT (2007–2010) data

Table 2 Job satisfaction and reasons for a hypothetical job change (proportions)

	Wage earner in private sector		Entrepreneur with employees		Entrepreneur without employees		Wage earner in public sector	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Very satisfied with job as a whole[1]	0.531	0.526	0.639	0.640	0.492	0.505	0.572	0.583
Very satisfied with some job facets:[1]								
Job stability	0.614	0.626	0.614	0.601	0.426	0.444	0.781	0.729
Labor income	0.293	0.259	0.371	0.404	0.232	0.205	0.313	0.341
Tasks performed	0.629	0.626	0.735	0.775	0.627	0.623	0.657	0.693
Time schedule	0.443	0.471	0.598	0.562	0.579	0.551	0.489	0.470
Very influential reasons for job change (multiple choice):[2]								
To improve job stability	0.220	0.213	0.131	0.124	0.193	0.168	0.183	0.218
To increase labor income	0.494	0.530	0.332	0.346	0.432	0.466	0.383	0.387
Changing in tasks	0.343	0.340	0.259	0.292	0.364	0.368	0.253	0.295
Time schedule improvement	0.362	0.401	0.283	0.317	0.328	0.332	0.246	0.286
Number of observations	8896	5806	973	356	2139	1053	2621	3150

[1] "Very satisfied" means 8 to 10 response in a 0 to 10 ordinal satisfaction scale

[2] "Very influential reason" means 8 to 10 response in a 0 to 10 ordinal influence scale

Source: Authors' calculations based on the ECVT (2007–2010) data

(Table 1): public sector employees and women show positive marginal effects compared to their counterparts. In general, it could be because women are more attracted to public employment than men because of their greater risk aversion or the greater facility of reconciling family and work life in this sector. These findings, which mean that women have a greater preference for public employment, align with those obtained by Vandenabeele (2008) and Steijn (2008) in choosing such employment.

Other findings are also interesting. First, it is observed that the estimate for public sector employees is, to some extent, a mirror image of what has been obtained for the rest of the professional situations in the sense that the signs of the estimated coefficients are contrary. Thus, for example, workers with university degrees show a greater preference for public work in the case of those already employed in that sector and lower in the case of employees in the private sector and entrepreneurs. This may be related to the fact that public administrations offer quality jobs but with a high barrier to entry. Those who already have public employment reaffirm their choice. In addition, those public employees who have overtrained with respect to that required by the job occupied are less inclined to the public sector probably because of the difficulties in progressing in their professional career within the administration.[10]

On the other hand, both the mental demands of the developed activity (level of stress and monotony) and the physical one (physical work) are related to the preference for public employment and in the expected direction. For employees in the

[10] This only partially supports the idea that the public sector, because of the system of selecting its workforce used in Spain (competitions or competitions), can attract mostly more qualified staff or, in many cases, overqualified.

Table 3 Logit marginal effects for the preference for public job. All workers and by professional situation

Variables	All workers	Wage earner in private sector	Entrepreneur with employees	Entrepreneur without employees	Wage earner in public sector
Professional situation [Ref.: wage earner in public sector]					
Wage earner in private sector	−0.308***				
Entrepreneur with employees	−0.372***				
Entrepreneur without employees	−0.335***				
Woman	0.065***	0.054***	0.104***	0.070***	0.056***
Age	0.004**	0.009***	−0.014	−0.000	0.004
Age^2/100	−0.006**	−0.012***	0.012	0.000	−0.003
Family situation [Ref.: no partner]					
Employed partner	−0.001	−0.001	0.018	−0.011	0.004
Unemployed partner	−0.001	−0.002	0.006	−0.019	0.019
Number of children < 3 years old	0.008	0.011	−0.043	0.013	0.011
Number of children from 4 to 5 years old	0.001	0.004	−0.003	−0.031	0.004
Number of children from 6 from 14 years old	0.001	−0.002	0.005	0.029*	−0.013^
Presence of dependent persons in household	0.006	0.028*	0.016	0.036	−0.052***
Educational level [Ref.: primary studies or less]					
Compulsory secondary education	−0.004	−0.002	−0.090**	−0.008	0.015
First Degree Vocational	−0.017^	−0.001	−0.213***	−0.058*	0.044*
Second Degree Vocational	−0.022*	−0.018	−0.086^	−0.101***	0.053**
Post- compulsory secondary education	−0.040***	−0.037**	−0.101**	−0.120***	0.037*
Higher education 3-year degree	−0.051***	−0.066***	−0.163***	−0.116***	0.058***
Higher education 5-year degree	−0.099***	−0.140***	−0.187***	−0.111***	0.040**
Monthly working hours	−0.000**	−0.000***	0.000^	−0.000	−0.000**
Very stressing job [1]	0.009	0.007	0.085***	0.020	−0.012
Very physical job[1]	0.025***	0.023**	0.014	0.031^	0.013
Very monotonous job[1]	0.028***	0.030***	0.061*	0.100***	−0.028**
Tenure (years)	−0.001***	−0.002***	−0.000	−0.001	−0.000
Formative mismatch [Ref.: formation is correct]					
Overformation	0.047***	0.080***	0.024	0.058*	−0.025**
Lower formation	−0.037*	−0.064**	−0.115^	0.090	0.056
Different formation	0.051**	0.073**	0.010	0.085^	−0.014
Activity sector [Ref.: agriculture and industry]					
Education	0.138***	0.153***	0.025	0.138*	0.075***
Health	0.151***	0.196***	−0.047	−0.017	0.104***
Rest of services	0.035***	0.046***	−0.014	0.025	0.053***
Town size [Ref.: <=10.00 inhab.]					
10.001-50.000	−0.003	−0.012	−0.001	0.058**	−0.004
50.000-100.000	0.006	0.001	0.006	0.025	0.022
100.001-1.000.000	0.004	0.000	−0.002	0.026	0.011

Table 3 (continued)

Variables	All workers	Wage earner in private sector	Entrepreneur with employees	Entrepreneur without employees	Wage earner in public sector
More than 1.000.000	−0.047***	−0.063***	−0.130*	−0.045	0.004
Regional unemployment rate	0.003***	0.006***	−0.001	−0.003	−0.001
Year [Ref.: year 2007]					
2008	0.008	0.010	0.011	0.041^	−0.017
2009	−0.058***	−0.083***	−0.042	−0.041	−0.010
2010	−0.053***	−0.069***	−0.014	−0.049	−0.014
Very satisfied with job as a whole[2]	−0.060***	−0.084***	−0.169***	−0.096***	0.055***
Number of observations	24,994	14,702	1,329	3,192	5,771
Pseudo R^2	0,0943	0.034	0,0691	0.042	0.045
Correct predictions (%)	64,6	58,5	63,6	59,6	85,1
Log pseudolikelihood	−15330.744	−9829.3942	−839.70272	−2116.71	−2316.233
Wald test	2328,53***	642.02***	113.31***	175.48***	226.42***
Degrees of freedom	38	35	35	35	35

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.10$, ^ $p<0.15$

[1] "Very stressing, physical or monotonous job" means 8 to 10 response in a 0 to 10 ordinal influence scale

[2] "Very satisfied" means 8 to 10 response in a 0 to 10 ordinal satisfaction scale

Source: Authors' calculations based on ECVT (2007–2010) data

private sector, there is a negative relationship between such preference with the workload, and the greater the seniority in the position, the lower the preference for public employment, probably as a result of a lower labor mismatch as the time in the company increases. Regarding the general context in which the job is carried out, private sector employees residing in large cities show less preference for working in the public sector. This may be because it is precisely in those cities where large companies are located that offer opportunities for career development to a greater extent than public employment. This would reflect potential competition for skilled human capital between the public and private sectors. The regional unemployment rate is positively associated with this preference for the group of public servants, probably because it is a general indicator of job insecurity.

The results for the complete sample also suggest that the variable of overall satisfaction introduced in the modelling is relevant for the explanation of the preference for public employment and with the expected negative sign. This supports the previously presented theoretical interpretation of preference for the public sector in terms of subjective well-being in general and job satisfaction in particular. By professional situations, the most satisfied public employees show their preference for work in the public sector (positive marginal effect), while the opposite occurs with private sector employees and entrepreneurs.

Table 4 shows the marginal effect obtained for the gender indicator variable (woman) when estimating different specifications of the explanatory model of preference for public work. The aim would be to check to what extent the satisfaction variables and those indicators of the reasons for the change of job, introduced alternatively, cause a reduction in the significance of the gender variable. All models are sta-

Table 4 Logit marginal effects for the preference for public job for all workers and by professional situation. Different sspecifications and selected variables

Specifications	All workers	Wage earner in private sector	Entrepreneur with employees	Entrepreneur without employees	Wage earner in public sector
1. Specification (1) [1]					
Women	0.065***	0.054***	0.104***	0.070***	0.056***
Very satisfied with job as a whole[2]	−0.060***	−0.084***	−0.169***	−0.096***	0.055***
Pseudo R2	0,0943	0.0337	0,0691	0.0423	0.0453
Correct predictions (%)	64,6	58,5	63,6	59,6	85,1
Log pseudolikelihood	−15330.744	−9829.3942	−839.70	−2116.71	−2316.23
Wald test (41)	2328,53***	642.02***	113.31***	175.48***	226.42***
2. Specification (2)					
Women	0.064***	0.054***	0.117***	0.069***	0.058***
Very satisfied with some job facets:[2]					
Job stability	−0.035***	−0.037***	−0.088***	−0.061***	0.020*
Labor income	−0.057***	−0.086***	−0.049^	−0.066***	0.022**
Tasks	−0.021***	−0.020**	−0.088***	−0.062***	0.017^
Time schedule	−0.007	−0.022**	0.048*	0.034*	−0.002
Pseudo R^2	0,0966	0,0374	0.065	0.046	0.041
Correct predictions (%)	65,4	59,4	63,4	60,6	84,7
Log pseudolikelihood	−15292.027	−9791.63	−843.62	−2108.49	−2326.03
Wald test (42)	2376.57***	708.87***	109.41***	188.24***	205.16***
3. Specification (3)					
Women	0.063***	0.052***	0.102***	0.069***	0.058***
Very influential reasons for job change[3]:					
Improving job stability	−0.045***	−0.054***	−0.072^	−0.016	−0.022^
Increasing of labor income	0.028***	0.050***	0.037	0.023	−0.024**
Change in tasks	0.062***	0.070***	0.158***	0.060***	0.002
Time schedule improvement	0.046***	0.049***	0.082**	0.064***	0.006
Pseudo R^2	0,098	0.037	0.073	0.044	0.041
Correct predictions (%)	64,9	59,3	64,2	60,0	85,1
Log pseudolikelihood	−15276.45	−9792.72	−836.04	−2112.30	−2327.40
Wald test (42)	2416,36***	703.63***	118.66***	184.43***	202.69***
Number of observations	24,994	14,702	1,329	3,192	5,771

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.10$, ^ $p<0.15$

[1] Specification (1) corresponds to the model of Table 3 that includes as a regressor the satisfaction with the job as a whole. Alternatively, instead of this last regressor, Specification (2) and (3) use respectively the satisfaction with some job facets and the very influential reasons for job change as regressors to explain the preference for public job

[2] "Very satisfied" means 8 to 10 response in a 0 to 10 ordinal satisfaction scale

[3] "Very influential reason" means 8 to 10 response in a 0 to 10 ordinal influence scale

Source: Authors' calculations based on ECVT(2007–2010) data

tistically significant, as shown by the adjustment indicators provided. Specification (1) corresponds to that given in Table 3 for the different professional situations. As indicated above, the gender variable is statistically very significant when the variable of overall satisfaction is included as a regressor, which is interpreted as the conditional distributions of preference for public employment are not homogeneous by gender. Specification (2) alternately adds instead of overall satisfaction, the satisfaction that workers declare of several job facets. It is observed that the gender variable does not lose its high statistical significance and also the magnitude of the marginal effects associated with this characteristic remain practically unchanged. Finally, Specification (3) adds as alternative regressors the reasons why the worker would change jobs. Again, the gender indicator variable shows high statistical significance with no notable changes in the magnitude of the estimated marginal effects. In this case, there is a high statistical significance of the variables that reflect these reasons, mainly for employees in the private sector.

Table 5 shows the result of estimating different specifications of the logit models presented in Table 4, in this case separately for men and women. To begin with, Specification (1) shows that the estimated marginal effects for overall job satisfaction are significant, with the expected signs and, in absolute value, these effects greater in the case of employers with employees. In general, the marginal effects estimated when subjective assessments of job facets are introduced (Specification 2) suggest that satisfaction with facets is more important for employed men than women. On the other hand, Specification 3 shows that the variables that indicate the reason for changing jobs are associated with statistically very significant marginal effects for private sector employees, independently of gender. For both men and women, those who declare an increase in job stability as an important reason for the change have less preference for public work, while those who declare as a reason for the change improvements in salary, change of activity or improvement in the schedule, show a greater preference for that type of work.

Conclusions

This paper aims to identify the factors why the working population declares its preference for public jobs. To do this, first, a theoretical model is presented that connects the preference for public employment with the declared satisfaction with current employment, considered as a whole and with facets of it. Based on the theoretical model, logit models have been estimated using different responses of workers' satisfaction with current employment and of values on work as indicators of preference for work in the public sector. Moreover, the preference for public job is analyzed for a sample that represents the entire employed population, that is, both entrepreneurs with and without workers and public and private employees. Therefore, in our analysis, we can differentiate by professional category in order to detect differences between these groups. Finally, the empirical research allows us to detect gender differences, which is very relevant in this area since public employment can offer women more flexibility to reconcile the family and professional spheres.

Table 5 Logit marginal effects for the preference for public job by professional situation and gender. Different specifications and selected variables

	Professional situation							
	Wage earner in private sector		Entrepreneur with employees		Entrepreneur without employees		Wage earner in public sector	
Specifications	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
1. Specification (1)[1]								
Very satisfied with job as a whole[2]	−0.083***	−0.087***	−0.160***	−0.176***	−0.080***	−0.120***	0.064***	0.047***
Pseudo R^2	0.031	0.030	0.080	0.080	0.049	0.055	0.031	0.049
Correct predictions(%)	58.1	60.5	64.5	65.7	61.5	59.7	80.1	88.9
Log pseudolikelihood	−5969.91	−3823.26	−599.80	−226.74	−1401.71	−687.50	−1248.14	−1047.50
Wald test (39)	359.11***	229.7***	92.76***	31.79	133.45***	74.29***	75.09***	115.61***
2. Specification (2)								
Very satisfied with some job facets:[2]								
Job stability	−0.048***	−0.018	−0.061*	−0.181***	−0.050**	−0.074**	0.038**	0.007
Labor income	−0.074***	−0.105***	−0.088***	0.065	−0.072***	−0.039	0.043**	0.005
Tasks	−0.017^	−0.027*	−0.102***	−0.070	−0.066***	−0.050^	0.019	0.015
Time schedule	−0.023**	−0.013	0.071**	0.029	0.065***	−0.039	−0.025^	0.016
Pseudo R^2	0.0348	0.035	0.082	0.081	0.0552	0.058	0.029	0.044
Correct predictions(%)	58.7	61.4	66.00	61.8	62.6	60.4	80.6	88.9
Log pseudolikelihood	−5948.56	−3806.03	−598.53	−226.56	−1392.67	−685.74	−1249.53	−1052.78
Wald test (41)	397.91***	261.98***	94.75***	35.18	144.31***	77.75***	72.51***	103.62***
3. Specification (3)								
Very influential reasons for hypothetical job change[3]								
Improving job stability	−0.056***	−0.053***	−0.049	−0.176*	0.010	−0.073^	−0.042*	−0.012
Increasing of labor income	0.048***	0.056***	−0.003	0.109*	0.022	0.017	−0.028^	−0.023*
Change in tasks	0.076***	0.060***	0.182***	0.128*	0.049*	0.082**	0.002	0.006
Time schedule improvement	0.048***	0.050***	0.099**	0.038	0.072**	0.052	0.029	−0.008
Pseudo R^2	0.035	0.034	0.091	0.082	0.055	0.053	0.027	0.044

Table 5 (continued)

	Professional situation							
Correct predictions(%)	58.9	60.5	65.8	63.2	60.9	61.1	80.7	88.9
Log pseudolikelihood	−5946.1	−3810.44	−592.43	−226.22	−1393.76	−689.06	−1252.99	−1052.26
Wald test (42)	403.55***	251.69	104.39***	35.89	150.61***	73.73***	68.37***	103.66***
Number of observations	8,896	5,806	973	356	2,139	1,053	2,621	3,150

Notes: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.10$, ^ $p<0.15$

[1] Specification (1) corresponds to the model of Table 3 that includes as regressor the satisfaction with the job as a whole. Alternatively, instead of this last regressor, Specification (2) and (3) use, respectively, the satisfaction with some job facets and the very influential reasons for job change as regressors to explain the preference for public job.

[2] Very satisfied means 8 to 10 response in a 0 to 10 ordinal satisfaction scale

[3] Very influential reasons mean 8 to 10 response in a 0 to 10 ordinal influence scale

Source: Authors' calculations based on ECVT(2007–2010) data

This study uses microdata from Quality of Work Life Survey conducted by Ministry of Labor and Social Issues of Spain to estimate logit models to identify the factors of why the working population declare preference for public jobs. All the models estimated include overall job satisfaction, job facets satisfaction and information on work values as key regressors together with a wide group of socioeconomic and work variables. Moreover, models for all workers as a whole and also for four different professional situations are estimated.

First, the results show that all the satisfaction variables are key factors explaining the preference for public job. Therefore, the results are in line with the idea that job satisfaction judgements can explain the declared preference for the public sector. The estimations also show that, after controlling by a wide set of sociodemographic, jobs and environmental characteristics, the gender variable continues to be highly significant in the explanation of the preference to work in the public sector. Aspects such as family composition have also been controlled but, despite this, women continue to show, ceteris paribus, a greater attraction for this type of jobs than men. The differences in the values that men and women give to the different facets of work are not part of the explanation of the gender gap. It is possible that the greater reconciliation between the family and work spheres that work in the public sector allows explains this difference. On the other hand, aspects related to the greater risk aversion of the female group that could not be controlled could help to understand this differential.

The empirical analysis detects significant differences between workers in the public and private sectors in terms of preference for public employment. In particular, current public employees show a greater attraction to work in this sector than other workers. This result would be explained because such a preference for public employment is intimately related by subjective judgments of job satisfaction to the extent that those jobs are already being enjoyed. In the case of the private sector, high job satisfaction is a factor of retention in current employment. This relationship is even more intense among entrepreneurs with employees.

Nevertheless, some weaknesses emerge from the empirical work. First, we use cross-sectional data. This means that we cannot control for unobservable individual heterogeneity. So, we estimate correlations between variables instead of causal effects. In fact, since we do not estimate structural equations but reduced ones, the estimated correlations between variables could be consistent with different economic, psychological and sociological processes. Panel data could help to improve our analysis (Arellano & Bover, 1990; Hsiao, 2007) in the sense, at least, of reducing also the impact of omitted variables. Despite these limitations, we think that our findings and our subsequent discussion are interesting and help to understand and to put the focus on the relationship between gender, working status, preference for public job and subjective judgments of job satisfaction.

Appendix

Table 6 Mean of variables included in the empirical analysis

	Asalariados sector privado			Empresarios con asalariados			Empresarios sin asalariados			Asalariado sector público		
Variables	Hombre	Mujer	Total	Hombre	Mujer	Total	Hombre	Mujer	Total	Hombre	Mujer	Total
Preference for public job	0.487	0.584	0.525	0.393	0.478	0.415	0.455	0.533	0.481	0.807	0.889	0.851
Women	0.000	1.000	0.395	0.000	1.000	0.268	0.000	1.000	0.330	0.000	1.000	0.546
Age	42.3	40.4	41.6	46.4	44.8	46.0	46.2	46.9	46.4	44.9	44.2	44.5
Age^2/100	19.1	17.5	18.4	22.6	21.1	22.2	22.4	23.1	22.7	21.3	20.5	20.8
Family situation:												
No partner	0.283	0.394	0.327	0.149	0.295	0.188	0.240	0.299	0.259	0.259	0.369	0.319
Employed partner	0.275	0.434	0.338	0.334	0.506	0.380	0.245	0.397	0.295	0.364	0.462	0.417
No-occupied partner	0.442	0.173	0.336	0.517	0.199	0.432	0.516	0.304	0.446	0.377	0.169	0.263
Number of children < 3 years old	0.119	0.113	0.117	0.129	0.135	0.131	0.109	0.070	0.096	0.102	0.091	0.096
Number of children from 4 to 5 years old	0.111	0.107	0.109	0.133	0.101	0.124	0.102	0.079	0.095	0.101	0.088	0.094
Number of children from 6 from 14 years old	0.297	0.260	0.283	0.401	0.368	0.392	0.330	0.247	0.302	0.318	0.325	0.322
Presence of dependent persons in household	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.062	0.090	0.069	0.074	0.093	0.081	0.076	0.083	0.080
Educational level												
Primary studies or less	0.239	0.180	0.215	0.209	0.121	0.185	0.300	0.273	0.291	0.133	0.068	0.097
Compulsory secondary education	0.246	0.210	0.232	0.195	0.185	0.193	0.244	0.204	0.231	0.145	0.095	0.118
First Degree Vocational	0.109	0.114	0.111	0.129	0.129	0.129	0.114	0.144	0.124	0.069	0.074	0.072
Second Degree Vocational	0.128	0.120	0.125	0.103	0.090	0.099	0.088	0.070	0.082	0.104	0.082	0.092
Post- compulsory secondary education	0.114	0.135	0.122	0.155	0.166	0.158	0.117	0.118	0.117	0.130	0.112	0.120
Higher education 3-year degree	0.069	0.117	0.088	0.075	0.121	0.087	0.050	0.054	0.051	0.149	0.274	0.217
Higher education 5-year degree	0.095	0.125	0.107	0.134	0.188	0.148	0.087	0.137	0.103	0.271	0.294	0.284
Monthly hours of work	179.6	155.6	170.1	208.8	188.4	203.3	201.3	177.4	193.4	166.2	152.6	158.8
Very stressing job[1]	0.293	0.325	0.306	0.497	0.534	0.507	0.363	0.373	0.367	0.290	0.343	0.319
Very physical job[1]	0.223	0.199	0.213	0.238	0.191	0.226	0.321	0.298	0.314	0.147	0.180	0.165
Very monotonous job[1]	0.230	0.248	0.237	0.177	0.194	0.181	0.240	0.256	0.246	0.206	0.177	0.190

Table 6 (continued)

	Asalariados sector privado			Empresarios con asalariados			Empresarios sin asalariados			Asalariado sector público		
Tenure (years)	11.7	8.9	10.6	15.7	12.7	14.9	16.2	12.4	15.0	15.7	14.1	14.8
Formative mismatch												
Formation is correct	0.836	0.780	0.814	0.885	0.893	0.887	0.890	0.830	0.870	0.812	0.806	0.809
Overformation	0.119	0.181	0.143	0.051	0.053	0.052	0.076	0.123	0.092	0.156	0.163	0.160
Lower formation	0.024	0.019	0.022	0.035	0.028	0.033	0.013	0.014	0.013	0.014	0.013	0.014
Different formation	0.021	0.020	0.021	0.029	0.025	0.028	0.022	0.032	0.025	0.018	0.017	0.018
Activity sector												
Agriculture and industry	0.524	0.203	0.398	0.467	0.154	0.383	0.500	0.212	0.405	0.113	0.021	0.062
Education	0.016	0.065	0.035	0.010	0.042	0.019	0.009	0.025	0.014	0.154	0.290	0.228
Health services	0.019	0.095	0.049	0.018	0.056	0.029	0.010	0.033	0.018	0.106	0.266	0.193
Other services	0.441	0.637	0.518	0.505	0.747	0.570	0.481	0.730	0.563	0.628	0.423	0.516
Regional unemployment rate	13.230	13.277	13.248	14.408	13.940	14.282	13.361	13.592	13.438	14.225	13.683	13.929
Year												
2007	0.251	0.245	0.249	0.212	0.222	0.214	0.233	0.200	0.222	0.227	0.231	0.229
2008	0.272	0.245	0.261	0.224	0.197	0.217	0.276	0.245	0.266	0.253	0.268	0.261
2009	0.232	0.237	0.234	0.291	0.312	0.296	0.247	0.242	0.245	0.277	0.256	0.265
2010	0.246	0.272	0.256	0.273	0.270	0.272	0.244	0.312	0.267	0.243	0.244	0.244
Very satisfied with job as a whole[2]	0.531	0.526	0.529	0.639	0.640	0.640	0.492	0.505	0.497	0.572	0.583	0.578
Very satisfied with some job facets[2]												
Job stability	0.614	0.626	0.618	0.614	0.601	0.610	0.426	0.444	0.432	0.781	0.729	0.753
Labor income	0.293	0.259	0.279	0.371	0.404	0.380	0.232	0.205	0.223	0.313	0.341	0.328
Tasks performed	0.629	0.626	0.628	0.735	0.775	0.746	0.627	0.623	0.626	0.657	0.693	0.677
Time schedule	0.443	0.471	0.454	0.598	0.562	0.588	0.579	0.551	0.570	0.489	0.470	0.478
Very influential reasons for job change[3]:												
To improve job stability	0.220	0.213	0.218	0.131	0.124	0.129	0.193	0.168	0.185	0.183	0.218	0.202

Table 6 (continued)

	Asalariados sector privado			Empresarios con asalariados			Empresarios sin asalariados			Asalariado sector público		
To increase labor income	0.494	0.530	0.508	0.332	0.346	0.336	0.432	0.466	0.443	0.383	0.387	0.385
Change in tasks	0.343	0.340	0.341	0.259	0.292	0.268	0.364	0.368	0.365	0.253	0.295	0.276
Time schedule improvement	0.362	0.401	0.377	0.283	0.317	0.292	0.328	0.332	0.330	0.246	0.286	0.268
Number of observations	8896	5806	14,702	973	356	1329	2139	1053	3192	2621	3150	5771

[1] "Very stressing, physical or monotonous job" means 8 to 10 response in a 0 to 10 ordinal influence scale

[2] "Very satisfied" means 8 to 10 response in a 0 to 10 ordinal satisfaction scale

[3] "Very influential reason" means 8 to 10 response in a 0 to 10 ordinal influence scale

Source: Authors' calculations based on the ECVT (2007–2010) survey

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Declarations

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