Trust, Social Capital and the Evolution of Human Sociality.

Abstract

In this contribution we want to integrate conceptuals developments in Theoretical Biology, Sociology and Anthropology into an Evolutionary Psychology approach. Evolutionary Game Theory tries to model the evolution of human social behavior, of cooperation in particular. “Strong altruism” has been recently defended as the best model of such a process. According to this view, non-kin cooperate because they are afraid of retaliation by all group members, rather than just the exploited individual; in other words, altruistic punishment is the way to make sure nobody free-rides. This approach, though, is defective in two ways: at the theoretical level, it opens up the possibility of free-riders that get the benefit of general punishment, but avoid the costs of punishment. At the empirical level, the evidence that human groups effectively implement “strong altruism” is missing. What we find at the empirical level is that cooperation is made possible by trust-building practices. In the anthropological literature, Mauss’ classical “Essay on the gift” remains amilestone, but much work from “Social Network” theory also shows how trust is build, maintained and restored, so that delayed exchanges can continue. In Sociology, the notion of “Social Capital”, despite its variety of meanings and uses, can also be understood as the resources an individual may have available through the valuable social relationships he developes through trust. Against this background, we will articulate our view of trust, as a complex attitude, that pressuposes affective links, cognitive tracking and moral emotions. We will argue that the complexity of human sociality, when compared to other species, has to do with the way Hominids developed the psychological scaffolding that made trust possible.