Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness.

Thumbnail Image

Files

PR-GSPAugust2020-15.pdf (100.52 KB)

Identifiers

URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10630/40332
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109493

Publication date

2020-11

Reading date

Authors

Collaborators

Advisors

Tutors

Editors

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Elsevier

Metrics

Google Scholar

Share

Export

Research Projects

Organizational Units

Journal Issue

Center

Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales

Department/Institute

Teoría e Historia Económica

Keywords

Juegos, Teoría de

Abstract

We study the problem of choosing one alternative given agent’s strict preferences. We show that preference reversal (Eliaz, 2004) implies group strategy-proofness. Moreover, they are equivalent for the special cases where only two or three alternatives may be chosen.

Description

https://openpolicyfinder.jisc.ac.uk/id/publication/15557

Bibliographic citation

Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness, Economics Letters, Volume 196, 2020, 109493, ISSN 0165-1765

Collections

Artículos

Endorsement

Review

Supplemented By

Referenced by