The bureaucracy trap

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dc.centroFacultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresarialeses_ES
dc.contributor.authorAndina-Díaz, Ascensión
dc.contributor.authorFeri, Francesco
dc.contributor.authorMeléndez-Jiménez, Miguel Ángel
dc.date.accessioned2024-02-01T13:12:46Z
dc.date.available2024-02-01T13:12:46Z
dc.date.issued2023-07-30
dc.departamentoTeoría e Historia Económica
dc.description.abstractWe study the incentives of political parties to institute reforms that improve bureaucratic quality and increase the ability of governments to implement policy change. We consider a context of dynamic elections where current rigidities do not permit large changes in policies. We show that reforms in which a sufficient share of benefits are experienced late in time will never be implemented if parties are patient enough.es_ES
dc.identifier.citationAscensión Andina-Díaz, Francesco Feri, Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, The bureaucracy trap, Economics Letters, Volume 228, 2023, 111166, ISSN 0165-1765, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111166es_ES
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111166
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10630/29638
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherElsevieres_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accesses_ES
dc.subjectPolítica - Reformaes_ES
dc.subject.otherPolitical alternationes_ES
dc.subject.otherInstitutional reformes_ES
dc.subject.otherBureaucracy trapes_ES
dc.titleThe bureaucracy trapes_ES
dc.typejournal articlees_ES
dc.type.hasVersionSMUR
dspace.entity.typePublication
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryb1c2169c-880b-483f-b7c5-2da865c91153

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