RT Journal Article
T1 Transmission and use of information in network games.
A1 Currarini, Sergio
A1 Feri, Francesco
A1 Hartig, Bjoern
A1 Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel Ángel
K1 Juegos, Teoría de
K1 Representación del conocimiento (Teoría de la información)
AB We design an experiment to study how agents share and make use of information in networks. Agents receive payo -relevant signals automatically shared with neighbours. We compare the use of information in different network structures, considering games in which strategies are substitute, complement, and orthogonal. To study the incentives to share information across games, we also allow subjects to modify the network before playing the game. We find behavioural deviations from the theoretical prediction in the use of information, which depend on the network structure, the position in the network, and the strategic nature of the game. There is also a bias toward oversharing information, which is related to risk aversion and the position in the network.
PB Elsevier
YR 2023
FD 2023-04-08
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/30262
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/30262
LA eng
NO Sergio Currarini, Francesco Feri, Bjoern Hartig, Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, Transmission and use of information in network games, European Economic Review, Volume 155, 2023, 104443.
NO Artículo publicado en European Economic Review en el volumen de junio de 2023 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104443). Se adjunta la versión aceptada, que según SHERPA (https://v2.sherpa.ac.uk/id/publication/13217) puede estar disponible en un repositorio institucional tras un embargo de 24 meses.
NO Funding from BA/Leverhulme Small Research Grants (ref. SG142951), from Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, Spain (ref. RTI2018-097620-B-I00 and PID2021-127736NB-I00) and from the Junta de Andalucía-FEDER (ref. UMA18-FEDERJA-243 and P18-FR-3840) is gratefully acknowledged.
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 21 ene 2026