RT Journal Article
T1 Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate
A1 Amorós-González, Pablo
K1 Economia
K1 Ciencias sociales
K1 Economía -- Métodos estadísticos
AB A group of experts has to pick one winner from a group of candidates. Each expert has a judgment about who is the best candidate. A social choice rule (SCR) is a function that aggregates experts’ judgments to determine the deserving winner. Experts may be biased and not want to reveal their judgments. We state a necessary and sufficient condition for implementing an SCR in dominant strategies. We show that no -supermajoritarian SCR with or -submajoritarian SCR with satisfies this condition
PB Elsevier
YR 2022
FD 2022-04-28
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/26324
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/26324
LA eng
NO Amorós, P. (2022). Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate. Economics Letters, 216, 110557.
NO Funding for open access charge: Universidad de Málaga / CBUA
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 4 mar 2026