RT Journal Article
T1 Condorcet consistency and pairwise justifiability under variable agendas
A1 Barberà, Salvador
A1 Berga, Dolors
A1 Moreno-Jiménez, Bernardo
A1 Nicolò, Antonio
K1 Elección social
K1 Toma de decisiones
AB We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement ofCondorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justi-fiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent whenapplied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, thesingle-peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains.
PB Wiley Online Library
YR 2025
FD 2025-02
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/40200
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/40200
LA eng
NO Barberà, S., Berga, D., Moreno, B. and Nicolò, A. (2025), CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS. International Economic Review, 66: 313-329.
NO MCIN
NO Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D
NO Generalitat de Catalunya
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 24 ene 2026