RT Journal Article
T1 A Product Channel Attack to Wireless Physical Layer Security
A1 Anaya López, Gonzalo Javier
A1 Gómez-Paredes, Gerardo
A1 López-Martínez, Francisco Javier
K1 Sistemas de comunicación inalámbricos - Medidas de seguridad
K1 Telecomunicaciones
AB We propose a novel attack that compromises the physical layer security in wireless systems with eavesdropper's channel state information at the transmitter side. This technique is based on the transmission of a slowly-varying random symbol by the eavesdropper during its uplink transmission, so that the equivalent fading channel observed at the base station (BS) has a larger variance. Then, the BS designs the secure downlink transmission under the assumption that the eavesdropper's channel experiences a larger fading severity than in reality. We show that this approach can lead the BS to transmit to Bob at a rate larger than the secrecy capacity, thus compromising the system secure operation. Our analytical results, corroborated by simulations, show that the use of multiple antennas at the BS may partially alleviate but not immunize against these type of attacks.
PB IEEE
YR 2021
FD 2021-01-11
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/40874
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/40874
LA eng
NO G. J. Anaya-Lopez, G. Gomez and F. J. Lopez-Martinez, "A Product Channel Attack to Wireless Physical Layer Security," in IEEE Wireless Communications Letters, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 943-947, May 2021, doi: 10.1109/LWC.2021.3050957
NO https://openpolicyfinder.jisc.ac.uk/id/publication/23590
NO Unión Europea
NO Junta de Andalucía
NO Universidad de Málaga
NO Gobierno de España
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 13 abr 2026