RT Journal Article
T1 Divisionalization in vertical structures.
A1 Bru, Lluís
A1 Fauli-Oller, Ramon
A1 Ordóñez-de-Haro, José Manuel
K1 Mercado - Análisis
K1 Industria - Aspectos económicos
K1 Análisis coste-beneficio
K1 Economía aplicada
AB We evaluate the incentives to create within-industry independent divisions once thevertical structure of the industry is considered. Divisionalization allows a firm to gainmarket share in the final market, but it also leads to an increase in total payments tothe input supplier. The less competitive the upstream market, the more important thesecond effect will be, and this reduces the profitability of divisionalization. As aconsequence, a less competitive upstream segment leads to a lower total number ofdivisions in equilibrium and a less competitive final market, harming end consumerswho will face higher prices.
PB Wiley
YR 2024
FD 2024
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/32484
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/32484
LA eng
NO Bru, L., Fauli-Oller, R., & Ordóñez-de-Haro, J.-M. (2024). Divisionalization in vertical structures. Managerial and Decision Economics, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4328
NO Funding for open access charge: Universidad de Málaga / CBUA. Conselleria d'Educació, Investigació, Cultura i Esport, Grant/Award Number: Prometeo/2021/073; Spanish Ministry of Economy and Innovation, Grant/Award Numbers: PID 2020-115018RB-C33, PID2021-127736NB-I00, PID2022-142356NB-I00.
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 20 ene 2026