RT Journal Article
T1 The role of nonzero conjectural variation in pollution abatement and output in the design of emission taxes.
A1 Gautier, Luis
K1 Contaminación - Reducción
K1 Impuestos ambientales
K1 Política ambiental
AB The presence of nonzero conjectural variations in pollution abatement and output make emission taxes less effective with respect to reducing emissions. This has implications for the characterization of the optimal emission tax, particularly in an international context where there are large asymmetries in pollution intensities. A higher degree of collusion in output between polluting firms results in higher emissions taxes in the non-cooperative equilibrium. In contrast, a higher degree of collusion in abatement between polluting firms results in lower emissions taxes in the non-cooperative equilibrium. These results rely on the presence of nonzero conjectural variations and large asymmetries in pollution intensities across countries. The analysis is relevant to the design of international environmental policy, including cases where countries face increasing global competition and damages from rising global emissions.
PB Cambridge University Press
YR 2021
FD 2021-06
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/31813
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/31813
LA eng
NO Gautier L. The role of nonzero conjectural variation in pollution abatement and output in the design of emission taxes. Environment and Development Economics. 2022;27(2):184-207. doi:10.1017/S1355770X21000127
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 24 abr 2026