RT Journal Article
T1 Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
A1 Berga, Dolors
A1 Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe
A1 Moreno-Jiménez, Bernardo
K1 Juegos, Teoría de
K1 Toma de decisiones
K1 Elección social
AB We study voting problems with an odd number of agents and single-peaked preferences. With only three alternatives, there are scoring rules that yield the Condorcet winner only for committees of three and five agents. With four or more alternatives, only committees of three agents work. In all these scoring rules, the best and worst alternatives are assigned a score of 1and 0, respectively, and any middle alternative a score between 0 and 1/2 . For five or more alternatives, the score of any middle alternative must be the same, and we call this family semiplurality scoring rules.
PB Elsevier
YR 2024
FD 2024
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/31133
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/31133
LA eng
NO Dolors Berga, Guadalupe Correa-Lopera, Bernardo Moreno, Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness, Economics Letters, Volume 181, 2019, Pages 199-202, ISSN 0165-1765,
NO Funding for open access charge: Universidad de Málaga / CBUA
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 12 abr 2026