RT Journal Article
T1 Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination
A1 Jiménez-Jiménez, Francisca
A1 Rodero-Cosano, Francisco Javier
K1 Teoría de juegos
AB This paper investigates experimentally the effects of communication in distinct games with complete information. We design four games resulting from the interaction between two incentive elements: strategic complementarity and coordination. These incentive elements allow to analyse the use of cheap talk as an efficiency-enhancing and coordinating device. We implement a restricted communication protocol (one-sided, optional, and closed-form) in repeated settings with fixed partners. Our findings provide robust evidence about how cheap talk interacts with incentives to explain strategic behaviour in a dynamic way. As expected, cheap talk increases efficiency under complementarity incentives, and the coordination level under coordination incentives. As novelty, the use of limited communication in repeated interactions has led to identify specific time-varying message profiles as the most effective messages in the coordination games. While the content of messages is explained by the complementarity incentives, faithfulness to credible messages is determined by the coordination incentives.
PB Springer Nature
YR 2021
FD 2021
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/39180
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/39180
LA eng
NO Jiménez-Jiménez, F., Rodero Cosano, J. Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination. Theory Decis 91, 235–263 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09795-9
NO Política de acceso abierto tomada de: https://openpolicyfinder.jisc.ac.uk/id/publication/16665
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 21 ene 2026