RT Journal Article
T1 Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation.
A1 Cabrales, Antonio
A1 Feri, Francesco
A1 Gottardi, Piero
A1 Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel Ángel
K1 Juegos, Teoría de
K1 Economía de la información
AB This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap-talk information. We find that the level of trade in these markets is very small and eventually vanishes. Sellers provide low-quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary payoff. This contributes to the low demand in the market for information. Moreover, we observe the same very low level of activity in the market for information when sellers face no conflict of interest and the noise in the quality of the transmitted information is much lower. Hence, we argue that the collapse of the market for information is a demand phenomenon, and even small uncertainty over the quality of information seems to have a large impact.
PB Elsevier
YR 2020
FD 2020-03-17
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/30258
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/30258
LA eng
NO Antonio Cabrales, Francesco Feri, Piero Gottardi, Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 121, 2020, Pages 368-381.
NO Artículo publicado en Games and Economic Behavior en el volumen de mayo de 2020 (https://doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.002). Se adjunta la versión aceptada, que según SHERPA (https://v2.sherpa.ac.uk/id/publication/15564) puede estar disponible en un repositorio institucional tras un embargo de 24 meses.
NO Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez acknowledges financial support from the Junta de Andalucía-FEDER through project UMA18-FEDERJA-243 and from the Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades through Project RTI2018-097620-B-I00.
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 21 ene 2026