RT Journal Article
T1 Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models.
A1 Barberà, Salvador
A1 Berga, Dolors
A1 Moreno-Jiménez, Bernardo
K1 Economía matemática
K1 Optimización matemática
K1 Modelos matemáticos
AB We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply.
PB Elsevier
YR 2021
FD 2021-10-09
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/40330
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/40330
LA eng
NO Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 131, 2022, Pages 1-28, ISSN 0899-8256
NO https://openpolicyfinder.jisc.ac.uk/id/publication/15564
NO Generalitat de Catalunya
NO Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación
NO Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness
NO Consejería de Economía y Conocimiento, Junta de Andalucía
NO CEX2019-000915-S and SEV2011-0075
NO PID2020-116771GB-I00
NO 2017SGR—0711
NO ECO2016-76255-P and PID2019-106642GB-I00
NO UMA18-FEDERJA-130
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 19 ene 2026