RT Conference Proceedings
T1 A License to free ride? Centrality, authority & ostracism in social-dilemma networks
A1 Ramalingam, Abhijit
A1 Van Leeuwen, Boris
A1 Rojo Arjona, David
A1 Schram, Arthur
K1 Juegos, Teoría de
AB We investigate the effects of power derived from centrality and authority on contributions in repeated social dilemma settings. Groups of five players play VCMgames on a fixed network, where there is one central player that connects two pairs of periphery players. Centrality is defined by the position that a player has in thenetwork. Central players are vital to maintain a connected network and therefore havemore power than players in the periphery. In some treatments the VCM is convertedto a multi-player trust game, where the central player is given more power by givingher the authority to allocate the joint funds raised through contributions. Our resultsshow that power matters; both centrality and authority yield more free riding than isobserved for players in the periphery. This goes unpunished. Powerful players are notexcluded more than others except in extreme cases. We conclude that power providesa license to free ride.
YR 2014
FD 2014-04-24
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10630/7427
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10630/7427
LA eng
NO Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech.
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 24 ene 2026