RT Journal Article
T1 Selecting a pooling equilibrium in a signaling game with a bounded set of signals
A1 Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel
K1 Juego
K1 Señalización
AB In this paper, we study a general class of monotone signaling games, in which the support of the signal is limited or the cost of the signal is sufficiently low and as a result, there are multiple pooling equilibria. In those games, when we relax the usual single-crossing condition, the typical restrictions on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs suggested by previous literature cannot discard any of the equilibria obtained. For this reason, we develop a new refinement called the most profitable deviator, which will be useful to select a unique equilibrium in those games. Additionally, when the standard single-crossing condition is satisfied, our criterion also chooses a unique equilibrium, which is the same as that selected by previous literature.
YR 2019
FD 2019-07-10
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/17994
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/17994
LA eng
NO Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech.
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 19 ene 2026