RT Journal Article
T1 Voting equilibria and public funding of political parties.
A1 Moreno-Jiménez, Bernardo
A1 Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe
K1 Partidos políticos
K1 Tácticas políticas
AB Direct public funding to political parties exists in most OECD countries and its allocation is executed on the basis of two principles: (i) proportional to the votes (or alternatively the number of seats), and (ii) equal distribution. We consider a situation in which there are two scenarios and two policies, where the optimal policy for each scenario is different. We study which policy is implemented when public political funding is introduced and voters are uncertain about the realized scenario. First, when the goal is to implement the optimal policy, we find that direct public funding to political parties is necessary if voters are more likely to be right than wrong about the scenario. Second, we characterize all equilibria based on voters’ beliefs, the amount of money proportionally allocated, and the parties’ preferences over the pairs scenario-policy and being in office.
PB Springer
YR 2024
FD 2024-09-30
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/40277
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/40277
LA eng
NO Correa-Lopera, G., Moreno, B. Voting equilibria and public funding of political parties. Soc Choice Welf 64, 699–720 (2025)
NO Ministerio Economía, Industria y Competitividad
NO Universidad Pública de Navarra
NO PID2020-114309GB-I00
NO PID2021-127119NB-I00
NO PJUPNA2023-11403
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 20 ene 2026