RT Journal Article
T1 Eliciting the deserving winner in the presence of enemies
A1 Amorós-González, Pablo
K1 Juegos, Teoría de
K1 Jurado
K1 Prejuicios
K1 Votación
K1 Elección social
AB We analyze the problem of a jury that has to select the deserving winner from a group of candidates when (i) the identity of the deserving winner is known to all jurors but not verifiable, (ii) each juror identifies with a different candidate whom they want to favor, and (iii) some jurors may have enemies among the candidates whom they want to harm. We introduce a necessary condition relating to the jurors’ enemies for implementing the deserving winner, called minimal impartiality. The mechanisms proposed in the literature to implement the deserving winner via backward induction fail when jurors have enemies, even though minimal impartiality is satisfied. We propose a simple sequential mechanism that successfully implements the deserving winner via backward induction, whether the jurors have enemies or not, as long as minimal impartiality is satisfied.
PB Springer Nature
SN 0176-1714
YR 2025
FD 2025-04-14
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/38831
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/38831
LA eng
NO Amorós, P. Eliciting the deserving winner in the presence of enemies. Soc Choice Welf (2025).
NO Funding for open access charge: Universidad de Málaga / CBUA
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 20 ene 2026