RT Journal Article
T1 Foreign direct investment under fiscal interdependence when policy is set unilaterally.
A1 Gautier, Luis
K1 Inversiones extranjeras
K1 Oligopolios
K1 Capitalistas y financieros
AB This paper develops a partial equilibrium model of foreign direct investment to analyzethe potentially opposing interests between a host and foreign country. The two countriesare  fiscally interdependent and the  fiscal variable is set unilaterally by the foreign country.The analysis indicates that  fiscal independence is welfare-enhancing, particularly in the casewhere the outflow of FDI is large. The case where a lump-sum subsidy is set to address theexit of  rms indicates that the need for subsidy payments subside under  fiscal independence.
PB Springer
YR 2017
FD 2017
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/31832
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/31832
LA eng
NO Gautier, L. Foreign direct investment under fiscal interdependence when policy is set unilaterally. Int Econ Econ Policy 14, 579–599 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-016-0358-y
NO Política de acceso abierto tomada de: https://v2.sherpa.ac.uk/id/publication/8027?template=romeo
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 20 ene 2026