RT Journal Article
T1 Entry deterrence when the potential entrant is your competitor in a different market
A1 Ropero-García, Miguel Ángel
K1 Monopolios
K1 Competencia económica
AB In this article, we present a two-period model in which one firm operates in two markets: a monopoly and a duopoly. Assuming that this firm has private information on the cross-price elasticity of demand between the products sold in both markets, it limits its quantity supplied in the monopoly market in order to make its rival in the other market believe that entry into the monopolized market is unprofitable. As a result of this strategy, the average prices observed in both markets increase. This result suggests that the detrimental effects of entry deterrence on consumers´ welfare are stronger than those predicted by previous literature.
PB Wiley Online Library
YR 2021
FD 2021
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10630/36471
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10630/36471
LA eng
NO Ropero MÁ. Entry deterrence when the potential entrant is your competitor in a different market. South Econ J. 2021; 87: 1010–1030. https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12478
DS RIUMA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Málaga
RD 19 ene 2026