2026-05-27T06:58:21Zhttps://riuma.uma.es/rest/oai/request

oai:riuma.uma.es:10630/141552026-02-03T11:52:51Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37959

Selection in Unsolicited Ratings: the Case of the Sovereign Debt Market Gibert, Anna Crédito This paper aims at contributing to the debate on whether unsolicited ratings are strategically motivated. I present evidence from the sovereign debt market that strategic motivation is not necessarily behind the patterns that we see in the data and propose a model of credit ratings and ancillary services that abstracts from strategic considerations. In my model, borrowers with different unobservable characteristics select themselves into different solicitation groups. In equilibrium, the model can generate either a negative or a positive selection on unsolicited ratings, depending on the share of unsolicited ratings in a given market. The economic mechanism analyzed in this paper implies a "natural" degree of market selection which is not associated to strategic motivation. 2017-07-07T10:56:58Z 2017-07-07T10:56:58Z 2017 2017-07-07 conference output http://hdl.handle.net/10630/14155 eng Seminarios de Teoría Económica Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales 20/04/17 open access by-nc-nd