2026-05-31T15:17:57Zhttps://riuma.uma.es/rest/oai/request

oai:riuma.uma.es:10630/263242026-02-03T10:54:17Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Amorós-González, Pablo author 2022-04-28 A group of experts has to pick one winner from a group of candidates. Each expert has a judgment about who is the best candidate. A social choice rule (SCR) is a function that aggregates experts’ judgments to determine the deserving winner. Experts may be biased and not want to reveal their judgments. We state a necessary and sufficient condition for implementing an SCR in dominant strategies. We show that no -supermajoritarian SCR with or -submajoritarian SCR with satisfies this condition Amorós, P. (2022). Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate. Economics Letters, 216, 110557. https://hdl.handle.net/10630/26324 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110557 Economia Ciencias sociales Economía -- Métodos estadísticos Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate