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oai:riuma.uma.es:10630/263612026-02-03T11:34:25Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37953

Conditioning competitive behaviour in experimental Bertrand markets through contextual frames Jiménez-Jiménez, Francisca Rodero-Cosano, Francisco Javier Economía de mercado Explaining framing effects is one of the main challenges faced by decision theories. This research experimentally examines how different contextual frames influence competitive behaviour in a Bertrand duopoly game (repeatedly played under a stranger matching), unexplored so far. The design comprises four frames: one abstract (a beauty-contest framing), two meaningful (the standard Bertrand framing and an access-to-river framing) and one evocative (a take-from-fund framing). Our findings show that, at first, the evocative frame differentiates from the rest mostly in market prices. While the evocative frame induces subjects to behave closer to the theoretical predictions initially, the others need some repetitions until convergence is achieved. Differences across frames eventually vanish at the end. During the transition, in the Bertrand frame, a quicker decay in prices is observed due to the behavioural reactions to historical market prices. Lastly, irrespectively of frames, behavioural reactions to immediate past information allow to explain strategic interaction in the long-run: a force-balance situation which is consistent with the related literature on price floors in Bertrand games. 2023-04-21T12:17:25Z 2023-04-21T12:17:25Z 2023-04-21T12:17:25Z 2023 journal article Jiménez-Jiménez, & Rodero-Cosano, J. (2023). Conditioning competitive behaviour in experimental Bertrand markets through contextual frames. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.101987 https://hdl.handle.net/10630/26361 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.101987 eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ open access Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional Elsevier