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Andina-Díaz, Ascensión Feri, Francesco Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel Ángel 2024-02-01T13:12:46Z 2024-02-01T13:12:46Z 2023-07-30 Ascensión Andina-Díaz, Francesco Feri, Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, The bureaucracy trap, Economics Letters, Volume 228, 2023, 111166, ISSN 0165-1765, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111166 https://hdl.handle.net/10630/29638 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111166 We study the incentives of political parties to institute reforms that improve bureaucratic quality and increase the ability of governments to implement policy change. We consider a context of dynamic elections where current rigidities do not permit large changes in policies. We show that reforms in which a sufficient share of benefits are experienced late in time will never be implemented if parties are patient enough. eng open access Política - Reforma The bureaucracy trap journal article