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oai:riuma.uma.es:10630/311332026-02-03T11:06:13Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37953

Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness Berga, Dolors Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe Moreno-Jiménez, Bernardo Juegos, Teoría de Toma de decisiones Elección social We study voting problems with an odd number of agents and single-peaked preferences. With only three alternatives, there are scoring rules that yield the Condorcet winner only for committees of three and five agents. With four or more alternatives, only committees of three agents work. In all these scoring rules, the best and worst alternatives are assigned a score of 1and 0, respectively, and any middle alternative a score between 0 and 1/2 . For five or more alternatives, the score of any middle alternative must be the same, and we call this family semiplurality scoring rules. 2024-04-23T10:08:05Z 2024-04-23T10:08:05Z 2024 journal article Dolors Berga, Guadalupe Correa-Lopera, Bernardo Moreno, Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness, Economics Letters, Volume 181, 2019, Pages 199-202, ISSN 0165-1765, https://hdl.handle.net/10630/31133 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.028 eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ open access Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional Elsevier