2026-05-31T02:12:42Zhttps://riuma.uma.es/rest/oai/request

oai:riuma.uma.es:10630/317812026-02-03T11:35:34Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Stathopoulou, Eleni author Gautier, Luis author 2019-08-08 We examine two alternative strategies that an environmental group can embark when interacting with a firm. The first one which is already discussed in the literature is when the group campaigns against the firm. The second one which has not been modelled in the literature is when the group collaborates with the firm (green alliance) to reduce the cost of the cleaner technology. We look at the case of both options being available for the group in a setting with an environmental tax. One of the main results of the paper argues that for higher taxation the conflict scenario is more likely to happen, implying that collaboration and a more stringent environmental policy are substitutes. This identifies a previously unexamined and possibly adverse effect of public policy on environmental quality because it weakens the impact of the pollution tax on emission intensity. We also characterise the optimal tax that maximises social welfare and find that under pure conflict –when conflict is the only option for the environmentalists– optimal tax is higher than when the group can choose to act against or join forces with the firm, indicating that a less stringent environmental policy is needed in the latter scenario. Stathopoulou, E., Gautier, L. Green Alliances and the Role of Taxation. Environmental and Resource Economics 74, 1189–1206 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-019-00364-5 https://hdl.handle.net/10630/31781 10.1007/s10640-019-00364-5 Impuestos ambientales Gestión de empresas - Aspectos ambientales Green Alliances and the Role of Taxation.