2026-05-29T23:47:26Zhttps://riuma.uma.es/rest/oai/request

oai:riuma.uma.es:10630/318322026-02-03T11:32:29Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Gautier, Luis author 2017 This paper develops a partial equilibrium model of foreign direct investment to analyze the potentially opposing interests between a host and foreign country. The two countries are fiscally interdependent and the fiscal variable is set unilaterally by the foreign country. The analysis indicates that fiscal independence is welfare-enhancing, particularly in the case where the outflow of FDI is large. The case where a lump-sum subsidy is set to address the exit of rms indicates that the need for subsidy payments subside under fiscal independence. Gautier, L. Foreign direct investment under fiscal interdependence when policy is set unilaterally. Int Econ Econ Policy 14, 579–599 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-016-0358-y https://hdl.handle.net/10630/31832 10.1007/s10368-016-0358-y Inversiones extranjeras Oligopolios Capitalistas y financieros Foreign direct investment under fiscal interdependence when policy is set unilaterally.