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oai:riuma.uma.es:10630/318322026-02-03T11:32:29Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37953

Gautier, Luis 2024-07-02T09:05:10Z 2024-07-02T09:05:10Z 2017 Gautier, L. Foreign direct investment under fiscal interdependence when policy is set unilaterally. Int Econ Econ Policy 14, 579–599 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-016-0358-y https://hdl.handle.net/10630/31832 10.1007/s10368-016-0358-y This paper develops a partial equilibrium model of foreign direct investment to analyze the potentially opposing interests between a host and foreign country. The two countries are fiscally interdependent and the fiscal variable is set unilaterally by the foreign country. The analysis indicates that fiscal independence is welfare-enhancing, particularly in the case where the outflow of FDI is large. The case where a lump-sum subsidy is set to address the exit of rms indicates that the need for subsidy payments subside under fiscal independence. eng open access Inversiones extranjeras Oligopolios Capitalistas y financieros Foreign direct investment under fiscal interdependence when policy is set unilaterally. journal article