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oai:riuma.uma.es:10630/324842026-02-03T11:04:06Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Bru, Lluís author Fauli-Oller, Ramon author Ordóñez-de-Haro, José Manuel author 2024 We evaluate the incentives to create within-industry independent divisions once thevertical structure of the industry is considered. Divisionalization allows a firm to gainmarket share in the final market, but it also leads to an increase in total payments tothe input supplier. The less competitive the upstream market, the more important thesecond effect will be, and this reduces the profitability of divisionalization. As aconsequence, a less competitive upstream segment leads to a lower total number ofdivisions in equilibrium and a less competitive final market, harming end consumerswho will face higher prices. Bru, L., Fauli-Oller, R., & Ordóñez-de-Haro, J.-M. (2024). Divisionalization in vertical structures. Managerial and Decision Economics, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4328 https://hdl.handle.net/10630/32484 10.1002/mde.4328 Mercado - Análisis Industria - Aspectos económicos Análisis coste-beneficio Economía aplicada Divisionalization in vertical structures.