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oai:riuma.uma.es:10630/324842026-02-03T11:04:06Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37953

Divisionalization in vertical structures. Bru, Lluís Fauli-Oller, Ramon Ordóñez-de-Haro, José Manuel Mercado - Análisis Industria - Aspectos económicos Análisis coste-beneficio Economía aplicada We evaluate the incentives to create within-industry independent divisions once thevertical structure of the industry is considered. Divisionalization allows a firm to gainmarket share in the final market, but it also leads to an increase in total payments tothe input supplier. The less competitive the upstream market, the more important thesecond effect will be, and this reduces the profitability of divisionalization. As aconsequence, a less competitive upstream segment leads to a lower total number ofdivisions in equilibrium and a less competitive final market, harming end consumerswho will face higher prices. 2024-08-30T09:39:09Z 2024-08-30T09:39:09Z 2024-08-30T09:39:09Z 2024 journal article Bru, L., Fauli-Oller, R., & Ordóñez-de-Haro, J.-M. (2024). Divisionalization in vertical structures. Managerial and Decision Economics, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4328 https://hdl.handle.net/10630/32484 10.1002/mde.4328 eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ open access Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional Wiley