2026-05-30T05:54:11Zhttps://riuma.uma.es/rest/oai/request

oai:riuma.uma.es:10630/388312026-02-03T11:30:51Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37953

Eliciting the deserving winner in the presence of enemies Amorós-González, Pablo Juegos, Teoría de Jurado Prejuicios Votación Elección social We analyze the problem of a jury that has to select the deserving winner from a group of candidates when (i) the identity of the deserving winner is known to all jurors but not verifiable, (ii) each juror identifies with a different candidate whom they want to favor, and (iii) some jurors may have enemies among the candidates whom they want to harm. We introduce a necessary condition relating to the jurors’ enemies for implementing the deserving winner, called minimal impartiality. The mechanisms proposed in the literature to implement the deserving winner via backward induction fail when jurors have enemies, even though minimal impartiality is satisfied. We propose a simple sequential mechanism that successfully implements the deserving winner via backward induction, whether the jurors have enemies or not, as long as minimal impartiality is satisfied. 2025-06-04T06:35:32Z 2025-06-04T06:35:32Z 2025-06-04T06:35:32Z 2025-04-14 journal article Amorós, P. Eliciting the deserving winner in the presence of enemies. Soc Choice Welf (2025). 0176-1714 https://hdl.handle.net/10630/38831 10.1007/s00355-025-01600-2 eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ open access Atribución 4.0 Internacional Springer Nature