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oai:riuma.uma.es:10630/402002026-02-03T10:55:07Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Barberà, Salvador author Berga, Dolors author Moreno-Jiménez, Bernardo author Nicolò, Antonio author 2025-02 We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement ofCondorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justi-fiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent whenapplied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, thesingle-peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains. Barberà, S., Berga, D., Moreno, B. and Nicolò, A. (2025), CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS. International Economic Review, 66: 313-329. https://hdl.handle.net/10630/40200 10.1111/iere.12728 Elección social Toma de decisiones Condorcet consistency and pairwise justifiability under variable agendas