2026-05-28T09:31:17Zhttps://riuma.uma.es/rest/oai/request

oai:riuma.uma.es:10630/402002026-02-03T10:55:07Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37953

Condorcet consistency and pairwise justifiability under variable agendas Barberà, Salvador Berga, Dolors Moreno-Jiménez, Bernardo Nicolò, Antonio Elección social Toma de decisiones We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement ofCondorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justi-fiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent whenapplied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, thesingle-peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains. 2025-10-14T08:21:50Z 2025-10-14T08:21:50Z 2025-10-14T08:21:50Z 2025-02 journal article Barberà, S., Berga, D., Moreno, B. and Nicolò, A. (2025), CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS. International Economic Review, 66: 313-329. https://hdl.handle.net/10630/40200 10.1111/iere.12728 eng open access Wiley Online Library