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oai:riuma.uma.es:10630/402882026-02-03T11:31:27Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Barberà, Salvador author Berga, Dolors author Moreno-Jiménez, Bernardo author Nicolò, Antonio author 2025-01 We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders (also for strict). Barberà, S., Berga, D., Moreno, B. et al. Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems. Soc Choice Welf 65, 309–333 (2025). https://hdl.handle.net/10630/40288 10.1007/s00355-024-01575-6 Elección social Toma de decisiones Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems