2026-05-27T21:57:33Zhttps://riuma.uma.es/rest/oai/requestoai:riuma.uma.es:10630/74172026-02-03T11:52:32Zcom_10630_2254col_10630_37959
Morales-Siles, Antonio José
2014-04-22T09:46:49Z
2014-04-22T09:46:49Z
2014-04-22
http://hdl.handle.net/10630/7417
QRE adds errors to human decisions, keeping the consistency of beliefs and decisions. The
stochastic generalization via a logistic choice rule of the Nash equilibrium has been shown
to have two appealing features: (i) its comparative statics properties are in some cases more intuitive than for the standard NE, and (ii) it explains experimental data that are consistent
with intuition but are not predicted by a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we show that level k
model, much simpler in terms of rationality requirements, reproduces the same
comparative statics and offers predictions close to the logit QRE within the class of games
with the local payoff property
eng
open access
Toma de decisiones (EstadÃstica)
An equivalence theorem for LQRE and level-k and one intuitive contradiction
conference output