

Symbolic bordering: newspaper representation of Muslims and Islam in Spain
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Introduction

According to the Union of Muslim Communities in Spain (UCIDE, as in Spanish), the “Muslim population” residing in this South European country almost reached 1.95 million people (4.2% of total population) in 2017 (UCIDE, 2018), thus amounting to close four hundred thousand more people than six years before (UCIDE, 2012). On the other hand, mostly Muslim Moroccans have become the largest immigrant community living in Spain.¹ Like so many Western countries, Spain has also experienced a rise in attitudes of rejection and hate incidents against Muslims along the last years.² Europe, De Bellaigue points out, “has become more anti-Muslim as it has become more Muslim” (2018). In his view, “as long as the Muslim population continues to increase so quickly, Islam will continue to cause apprehension among very large numbers of Europeans.”³

It is a widespread assumption, on the one hand, that Western values and individuals of Islamic faith and/or culture (Muslims hereinafter) are incompatible. On the other, it is a common place to talk about ‘the’ Western opinion and attitude (as if unique) towards Muslims and Islam (M&I hereinafter). By questioning both premises (Brown, 2006; Greenberg and Miazhevich, 2012; Bowe and Makki, 2016), the aim of this study is to analyse the image(s) of M&I that mass media are portraying to the public in Spain. To what extent is the Spanish press contributing to either inclusion or exclusion of Muslims as part of ‘us’, and thus to either the acceptance or rejection of ‘them’? In other words, to what extent is the press imposing a dichotomous vision confronting ‘us,’ the Westerners, with ‘them,’ the Oriental ‘other’ (Said, 1978), the strange ‘other’ (Bauman, 2016), the Muslim ‘other’ (see also Said, 1981)? There are empirical studies focused on other countries, but there is almost a research void regarding the Spanish case.⁴ As long as the

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¹ Official data are provided by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (<https://www.ine.es>).

² See the reports on Islamophobia in Europe by the Foundation SETA on <http://www.islamophobiaeurope.com>. As to the Spanish case, the annual reports by the Citizen Platform against Islamophobia are available at <http://plataformaciudadanacontralaislamofobia.org>.

³ In the same vein, even though with regard to immigration, Kaufmann and Goodwin have observed that opposition to immigration is higher the faster the rise of ethnic minority groups in relative terms (2018).

⁴ Martín et al. (1997) and Zurbano et al. (2017) address the issue.

media are relevant in the process of public opinion building, it is worth turning attention to the collective imaginary of M&I they contribute to shape.

It is not unusual to find critical opinions by Muslims themselves over the distorted image that 'the' media portray of Islam, either in in-depth interviews (Desrués and Pérez-Yruela, 2008; Butler-Sloss and Kessler, 2015), in group discussions (Mijares and Lems, 2018) or in surveys (Ameli and Merali, 2015). Authors call attention to the fact that this results in Muslims distancing themselves from the society which they are part of (Kunst et al., 2012). It is a critical comment usually made in generic terms, without empirical evidence to support it, and not merely on the part of Muslims. It is the case of non-Muslim Alba in stating that "the media have always portrayed Islam as a homogeneous and absorbent force (...) systematically described as threatening and negative" (2015: 69). Cebolla and González-Ferrer, on their own, contend that "the discriminatory tendency towards the Muslims at large throughout the European Union [is] a reflection of the deep-rooted stereotypes that are often echoed by the mass media" (2008: 251-252; see also Revenga and El Mouden, 2010: 7).

The purpose of this study is to calibrate through quantitative content analysis such assumed bias. In trying to answer the empirical questions stated above, we will also ask the extent to which the media hold a unique or hegemonic narrative, and whether possible differences among them are to be explained in ideological and/or territorial terms. We will analyse the coverage of three of the most-read Spanish newspapers: *Abc*, *El País* and *La Vanguardia*. The next section provides the theoretical framework of the paper. A section on methodology follows before we discuss our results. The last section concludes with the central findings of this research.

Islamophobia: A Research Issue

M&I have reached a Western media presence in the XXI century unacknowledged throughout the previous one. The turning point were the terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001.⁵ It has been a quantitative but also a qualitative change. Even though the paradigm shift is previously observed (Brown, 2006), it is since then that the framing of M&I as linked to fanaticism and a threat to the West becomes hegemonic (Ruigrok and Van Atteveldt, 2007). It happens to the detriment of the previously hegemonic image of the Islamic as exotic and sensual. As Berbers et al. (2016) have put it, it is a tendency of the news sector in covering M&I that goes hand in hand with the growing Islamophobia. For Corm (2004), a false dichotomy or "fracture imaginaire" has been imposed between the West, 'us,' and the East, 'them' (see also Saeed, 2007; Ibrahim, 2010). With the incidents of 9/11 acting as a catalyst, media discourse is evoking Said's Orientalist approach (1978), that is, what Said critically defined as the orientalisation of the Muslim 'other,' an 'other' to be rejected and fearful of (Ahmed and Matthes, 2016; Creutz-Kämpfi, 2008). Even though recognising the contribution of Said, authors such as Corrales understand that using the term 'Islamophobia' is more appropriate than talking about Orientalism (2014: 8).

Islamophobia is a form of racism. It implies the rejection of Muslims, not because of their phenotypic traits, but because of their religious and/or cultural identity. Anti-Islamic racism is a narrative, an attitude, and/or a behaviour that should not be confused with criticism of Islamic issues (Imhoff and Recker, 2012). It implies a rejection of Muslims as such and in their entirety. In the extreme, such a form of hatred implies a desire for

⁵ As to the USA, the Dutch and the British cases, see respectively Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2007), Roggeband and Vliegthart (2007), and Baker et al. (2013a).

Muslims to go badly or that, in being so different from the ‘us’ who rejects them (either by fear or hatred), do not enjoy ‘our’ goods. It is usually understood that Islamophobia is given with suspicion and rejection, thus without the need for the desire for evil to be present.

The first Runnymede report (Richardson, 1997) has become a landmark of studies on Islamophobia (see i.e. Anderson, 2015; Bowey and Makki, 2016). It defines “unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims” as a constellation of eight aspects of “closed” vs. “open” views of Islam: (1) whether Islam is seen as monolithic and static, or as diverse and dynamic; (2) as other and separate, or as similar and interdependent; (3) as inferior, or as different but equal; (4) as an aggressive enemy or as a cooperative partner; (5) as manipulative or as sincere, as well as (6) whether Muslim criticisms of ‘the West’ are rejected or debated; (7) whether discriminatory behaviour against Muslims is defended or opposed, and (8) whether anti-Muslim discourse is seen as natural or as problematic.

Even though with no reference to the Runnymede report, Alba (2015) has synthesised those eight aspects of Islamophobia into three “mechanisms” by means of which it is built “an ‘other’ which is manipulable and eventually exterminable”: the reduction of the Muslim ‘other’ to a negative (a threatening actor) and “unassimilable” (“incurable”) unit (a homogeneous agent). Regarding refugees, Chouliaraki and Zaborowski’s three “narrative strategies” of “symbolic bordering” of the ‘other’ (2017) are analytically interesting: “silencing” (the omission of voice in the media discourse), “collectivization” (the reduction of the individual to undifferentiated member of a presumed community), and “decontextualization”, or absence of contextualization of the phenomenon when framing it. By focusing on the populist dimension of Islamophobia, Hafez (2017 and 2010) has introduced the concept of Islamophobic populism. He refers to the populism that sees the people threatened, not by a perverse elite, but by Islam. Like many others, this author understands that Islamophobes perceive Islam as a homogeneous, static and monolithic body, on the one hand, and, on the other, as reactionary, hostile, etc.

Most empirical studies on media coverage of M&I attend to the positive or negative image that is portrayed of them. In their review of the literature, Ahmed and Matthes (2016) have concluded that both the negative representations and the national topic of the integration of the Muslims – addressed as a problem as well – are common to the countries under research. As Kaya has summed up (2017), for more than a decade most immigrants of Muslim background and their descendants in European societies are often associated with illegality, crime, violence, drugs, radicalism, fundamentalism, conflicts and many other aspects because of which they are represented in a negative way. In their longitudinal case study of the Dutch press, Roggeband and Vliegthart (2007) observed that the Islamic aspect appears in a prominent way as a threat to national norms and values.

It is so because of issues such as the separation of church and state, homosexuality, gender equality and freedom of expression. Thus, the “threat to cultural security” on the part of the Muslims (Kaya, 2017: 60; Berbers et al., 2016) is added to the threat to physical and economic security, so present in the media discourse about immigration. Islamic clothing use to be portrayed as a challenge to the prevailing dress codes of secular or non-Muslim society. It is a discourse that opposes Islam to the values of the Enlightenment and even to those of Christianity (Creutz-Kämpfi, 2008), and that it has nourished criticism of multiculturalist policies in favour of assimilationist ones (Keskinen, 2014). In this way, public opinion is not exposed to the knowledge of the differences of an equal, but to

his/her/their othering. The Muslim ‘other’ turns out to be a “menacing stranger” (Creutz-Kämpfi, 2008: 298; Bauman, 2016).

News Media Framing of Muslims and Islam

Journalism “is about doing things with words, not simply about using words to report facts” (Chouliaraki, 2013: 268). It acts on people’s perceptions of reality, so it is a “performative practice” (Chouliaraki and Zaborowski, 2017: 616). Mass media use three fundamental mechanisms when informing and shaping public opinion: they select the issues to be considered as news (thus contributing to set the agenda of topics of public interest), hierarchise them, and adopt a point of view, namely, the media help to understand and confer a meaning on the reported issues and their implications. The quantitative analysis of these aspects of journalistic work (content analysis) and their impact on power relations is carried out through the respective agenda-setting theory, priming theory and framing theory. In Entman’s words, they three are “critical tools in the exercise of political power” (2007: 163). As to M&I, the academic production is mostly based on the framing theory. It is a field of study still to be explored regarding the Spanish case. This paper attempts to fill that void.

Authors who study media coverage by focusing on frames do analyse the extent to which the media, in addition to setting the public agenda of topics, induce in the public a way of understanding such issues (De Vreese et al., 2011; Scheufele and Iyengar, 2011; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). The media do not only represent or mirror reality. They mostly frame it. Given that any news can be covered in different ways, and since the way in which it is covered by the media conditions the cognitive and attitudinal processing, frames are what lead to interpreting the same issue differently based on the one adopted. According to the classic definition by Entman (1993), framing entails defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgements, and suggesting remedies. The definition of the problem or issue implies the identification of the group or individual (the subject). It is an aspect that in turn has made it advisable to attend to sources and voices which news texts are elaborated with, especially in order to see the extent to which the subjects themselves are present in the stories, namely, whether or not they are “subjects of voice” (Chouliaraki and Zaborowski, 2017).⁶ It is through all such a mechanism that the media certainly do not determine (Bowe et al., 2015), but induce opinions, attitudes and ultimately behaviours.

Media effects on those who are exposed to them is also accredited regarding M&I. Ahmed and Matthes (2016) confirm in their review of the literature that the 2004-2008 increase in Islamophobia in the USA can be explained in relation to the different media treatment of M&I, being more prejudiced than in Europe. Saleem et al. (2015) have experimentally proven that citizens are more likely to support policies that harm Muslims the more they are exposed to coverage that represents them as terrorists.⁷ The authors add that, whereas affecting in the medium term regardless of the ideology, media coverage mainly affects conservatives in the short term. McElwee and McDaniel (2015) have documented that, while Republicans in the USA have a higher perception of Muslim as violent people than Democrats, the gap between them is reduced and the negative perception by both groups

⁶ Felicetti and Gattinara (2018) have observed in their analysis of *The Guardian*'s coverage of the Charlie Hebdo January 2015 terrorist attacks that women and religious groups, Muslims in particular, had limited visibility, such as the actors who questioned the dominant security narrative.

⁷ As to the media stories on immigration, Givens and Luedtke (2005) have found that the mere increase of them contributes to making the corresponding policies more restrictive.

increases when they regularly watches Fox News TV channel.⁸ With respect to public policies, Uitermark and Giele (2010) have concluded in a case study that national authorities do not act against radicalism in mosques because it is the problem of a neighbourhood, but because of being impelled to by media coverage.

Roggeband and Vliegenthart (2007) have identified five frames in their comparative study of Dutch media and political discourses about immigration and the integration of immigrants. Whereas only one of them is positive – the “multicultural” frame – and making the other four frames a problem out of immigration, the one that has gained the most presence since 9/11 is the “Islam-as-threat” frame. Such a frame focuses on values and culture (see also Chouliaraki and Zaborowski, 2017). In another paper on the Netherlands, D’Haenens and Bink (2007) have found that media frames negatively problematise both the economic consequences and issues of morality when addressing M&I. With regard to framing in the USA, Greenberg and Miazhevich have pointed out in analysing the *New York Times* “a shift from a sympathetic tone toward British Muslims to an open hostility to and an ‘Othering’ of Britain” (2012: 91). Islam became the salient aspect of British Muslim identity after 9/11, and the UK was generally portrayed as “an unequal partner in the fight against Islamic extremism, weakened by its home-grown terrorism” (2012: 92).

The predominance of a given frame, the negative one, does not imply it to be the only one. Roggeband and Vliegenthart (2007) have found a variety of frames, even though media framing appears less varied compared to parliamentary framing. Anderson has compared Australian coverages on M&I by differentiating between “open” and “closed” frames,⁹ and she has observed a variation in time in favour of the former; in her view, as a reaction to critics of “unfair, unbalanced, and inflammatory reporting” on issues related to M&I in the mid-2000s (2015: 265). Bowe et al. (2015) have also studied the USA coverage after 9/11 in binary terms, in their case by attending to the tone: “positive” vs. “negative” frames. The authors have concluded that, whereas negative framing prevails, neutral framing is the one with the greatest presence. In line with Bowe et al. (2015), Bowe and Makki have concluded in studying mosques as a matter of public debate that “it would be an oversimplification to say representations of Muslims are uniformly negative” (2016: 551).

While Muslims are mostly ill-treated in media coverage, scholars have also obtained evidence that the diversity and frequency of frames varies according to the editorial line (left or right), the type of newspaper (tabloid or broadsheet) and the territory, at least in the case of countries with sub-state nationalisms. Through critical discourse analysis, Baker et al. (2013a and 2013b) have observed a more balanced coverage in the left-oriented newspapers and a greater tendency to associate Islam and terrorism among the tabloids. Scalvini points out that the conservative press expresses “a preoccupation with the rising cultural and religious diversity,” whereas progressive dailies are “more focused on promoting social cohesion and pursuing the joint goals of inclusion and integration” (2016: 624). Berbers et al. (2016) have documented that quality newspapers and those on the left adopt less problematic frameworks than tabloids and right-wing broadsheets. Focusing on Muslims living in Belgium who went to Syria to fight against Bashar al-Assad in 2013, they have also observed, firstly, that the frames that problematise the Syria

⁸ See Eyssel et al. on how the biased TV representation of Muslims is “one important factor in the widespread emergence and existence of Islamophobia in Germany” (2015: 197).

⁹ Worried about the definition of ‘us’, Chouliaraki and Zaborowski differentiate between the “cosmopolitan” frame (“open, hospitable and inclusive”) and the “communitarian” one, which they describe as “closed, phobic and introverted” (2017: 615).

fighter situation are used much more frequently than the other frames; secondly, that Flemish newspapers pay more attention to the matter, and, lastly, that they covered it, compared to the thematic or contextualising option, more by the episodic frame than the Dutch press.

Research Object and Design

Van Dijk differentiates between racist discourse *directed at* (the racialised) ‘others’ and *about* (the racialised) ‘others’ (2004: 351, in Hafez, 2017: 396). The object of this study is that second discourse; in particular, it tries to assess the extent to which the media discourse on M&I in Spain makes Muslims a strange ‘other,’ an ‘other’ to be suspicious of and to reject, no matter whether they are explicitly wished ill or not. In other words, it aims to analyse whether Islamophobic framing also predominates in the Spanish press or, on the contrary, the pluralism of information is translated into a diversity of frames and even a predominance of the integrative one. Neither all Muslims are the same nor Muslims are only defined by their religious dimension. To be more precise, the question at the backbone of this research is whether and to what extent the Spanish media discourse constructs a homogenising, excluding and problematising imaginary of M&I.

That triple combination is what ultimately characterises Islamophobia (see above). Our study is of a deductive nature (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). We analyse the extent to which the three pre-defined frames occur in the news. As shown in Figure 1, it will be analysed the presence of the inclusive frame – the subject as being part of the reference ‘us’ – vs. the exclusive frame, thus the subject being a strange ‘other.’ Secondly, it will be measured the extent to which M&I are assumed as a homogeneous whole or as a heterogeneous reality. Lastly, we will assess the extent to which the adopted frame problematises M&I or not. Given that the selection of news stories is based on the coverage of M&I, the database introduces a religious bias, so the extent to which the press reduces individuals of ‘perceived’ Mohammedan faith or cultural identity to its religious dimension – another Islamophobic trait – will not be studied.

Media discourse is not merely constructed according to one of the frames of each pair, but also as an invalidation of the other one. In those cases, the terms and/or texts of the research are coded as the frame alternative to the one that is neutralised. On the other hand, the messages transmitted by journalists can also be confusing, ambivalent or imprecise. In such occasions, given the impossibility or difficulty of determining a given frame, it can be concluded that the information coverage does not tend to shape public opinion in one way or another. Those terms and/or texts are coded as of a third frame and labelled as ‘neutral’ (Anderson, 2015; Bowe et al., 2015).¹⁰

As a first hypothesis, it is expected the predominant frame to be Islamophobic (H1), although it is foreseeable media coverage to be plural in terms of frames (H2) and left-wing outlets both to be more plural than those on the right and covering M&I according to the integrative frame to a larger extent (H3), with the centrist dailies in an intermediate position. Furthermore, although the centrist newspaper of the study is not Spanish in a territorial sense, but clearly Catalan,¹¹ ideology is expected to weigh more in framing M&I than territoriality (H4), in coherence with other studies (Durán, 2016) and despite the amount of people with perceived-Muslim identity residing in Catalonia (UCIDE, 2018). Finally, we cannot expect that each media outlet frames uniformly all the issues


¹⁰ We avoid the neutral frame in Figure 1 for the sake of clarity.

¹¹ Catalonia is a region of Spain.

that it covers about M&I (H5), so possible internal variations and coincidences between dailies will also be analysed.

To answer the question of the research and test the hypotheses, a matrix has been elaborated from the reviewed literature, mostly from Nickels’ approach (2007; see also Entman, 1993). It allows to identify and quantify how the Spanish press frames M&I. Three analytical categories determine media coverage of M&I as to framing: (1) the identification of the subject (how M&I are framed); (2) the voices and sources of the discourse (from whom the newspapers feed to build their narrative), and (3) the definition or identification of the news object (what topic or issue is addressed). For the first category, the entries “Islam*” and “Muslim*” are coded. The second category implies the codification of all the terms used to specify the persons, organizations or institutions whose opinion is reported, either in direct or in indirect style, that is, whether voices or sources, respectively. As to the third category, the topics of the news are codified in each of the texts. The resulting matrix allows assessing the adopted frame (one of each pair showed in the central column of Figure 1) for each of the categories (see column on the left). The systematisation of the analysis – 5,083 words or sets of words have been coded – has been done using Atlas.ti.

Figure 1. Analytical matrix of Muslims and Islam media framing



Source: own elaboration

Many studies focus on the coverage of concrete events, which use to receive attention due to the tensions or conflicts around them: construction of mosques (Bowe and Makki, 2016), cartoons of Muhammad (Creutz-Kämpfi, 2008), prohibition of the use of the integral veil (Fernández-Suárez, 2016), etc. On the contrary, this study focuses on the normality that is mediatically constructed over a period of time; specifically, the twelve months of 2017. That normality is what becomes Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus,’ the ‘common sense’ of each historical time (1994). After 9/11 and the subsequent Spanish 11-M attacks,¹² 2017 is not a conflictive year over M&I issues. Even the humanitarian crisis of either migratory flows or forced displacement (being Muslims most refugees

¹² After New York, Madrid was the largest Western city to suffer jihadist attacks, on 11th March 2004. London would follow them in 2005. From then on attacks have occurred in the same and other Western cities.

arriving in Europe) reduced its media impact after having been more acute in 2015.¹³ During 2017, on the other hand, jihadist attacks continued to be perpetrated, but they did not convulse or received the same media attention as before (De Bellaigue, 2018). They did neither in the case of attacks in Catalonia, in August, even though they make the study of that year more relevant – to see if that unique event altered the coverage and in what sense. All that makes of 2017 an optimum year for the study.

The analysis focuses on three of the six Spanish general information newspapers with the most daily readers throughout 2017: from highest to lowest readers, ‘El País’ (EP hereinafter), ‘La Vanguardia’ (LV) and ‘Abc’ (ABC). According to the General Media Survey (EGM, as in Spanish),¹⁴ they are also the three whose website had a greater number of unique visitors throughout the period. The election of the three broadsheets is also justified by both their ideological orientation and their editorial headquarters: right-wing ABC and left-wing EP are edited in Madrid and have a national projection, whereas centrist LV is published in Barcelona and, not being a regional newspaper, is markedly Catalan.¹⁵ This aspect is interesting, above all, because Catalonia is the region with the greatest presence of Muslims, a variable that could affect media framing and justify one of our hypotheses.

Our database is made up of the press clippings in which the terms “Islam*” and/or “Muslim*” appear. While most studies focus on these two (Bowe et al., 2015), we add to our search “veil*,” “scarf*,” “hijab*,” “niqab*,” “burka*,” “mosque*,” “minaret*,” and “imam*.” We have used the MyNews digital archive. Regarding the news on international issues, the clippings that have been incorporated into the documentary corpus are those using the search terms in the headlines, in the sub-titles, in the leads, in the pull-quotes or in the captions; they are the texts in which, to some extent and whatever the issue and the framing, the topic is Islamised. Insofar as the study of the coverage of jihadist terrorism is a research field in itself and in order to avoid research bias, the journalistic pieces about it and about war conflicts in Muslim-majority countries are discarded. The documentary base is finally made up of 432 analysis units.

Results

Descriptive Approach to Media Coverage

Our database is the journalistic attention provided by ABC, EP and LV to the Islamic throughout 2017. As it is shown in Table 1, EP covered contents on M&I to a lesser extent than ABC and LV. The differences between the newspapers is more marked by type of analysis unit: although the three mostly opt for news and reports, more than half of the total front pages, editorials and letters to the editor are by ABC. The right-wing daily also surpasses EP and LV in the opinion space with more entries: op-eds and columns.

Media coverage is regularly distributed throughout the year, with records accumulated in just over half of the days (see Table 1). LV is the newspaper that devotes attention to Islamic issues for more days (less than a third of the 365 total). Just one entry per day is recorded in 67% (ABC and LV) and in 70% (EP) of those days with coverage. ABC only collects more than two entries in 17 editions, 10 and 8 in the case of EP and LV,

¹³ Data of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees can be consulted at <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>.

¹⁴ EGM reports can be consulted at <http://www.aimc.es>.

¹⁵ For more information on the ideological orientation of the Spanish media, see Castromil (2012), Humanes (2014), and Durán (2016).

respectively. Barely four Spanish news stories provoke more than two pieces of coverage in the same day, be they from the same newspaper or from more than one.

Table 1. Media attention by words, days, documents and type of documents (year 2017)

		Total (3 dailies)	<i>Abc</i>		<i>El País</i>		<i>La Vanguardia</i>	
			Total	(%)*	Total	(%)*	Total	(%)*
Documents	Total	432	152	35.2%	130	30.1%	150	34.7%
	Front pages	8	5	62.5%	2	25.0%	1	12.5%
	News / reports	325	103	31.7%	110	33.8%	112	34.5%
	Op-eds / columns	70	32	45.7%	15	21.4%	23	32.9%
	Letters to the editor	12	8	66.7%	1	8.3%	3	25.0%
	Editorials	7	4	57.1%	1	14.3%	2	28.6%
	Interviews	10	0	0.0%	1	10.0%	9	90.0%
Words		246,800	77,581	31.4%	73,527	29.8%	95,691	38.8%
Days**		200	85		86		105	

* Percentages of row, with respect to the corresponding total of the three newspapers.

** Days with news in the database. The sum of the days of coverage of each newspaper totals more than 200 because there are days when two or three newspapers coincide with news about Muslims and/or Islam.

Source: own elaboration.

Analytic Categories and Media Frames

The above data hardly allow to deduce the opinion that the media tend to conform among citizens. In order to analyse the frame adopted by the media in addressing issues related to Islam – or in Islamising news contents – we have introduced 100 codes. This has resulted in a total of 22,296 coded records. The next section analyses the frame adopted by the newspapers when referring to M&I as subjects of the published information and opinions. We then address, first, the voices and sources on which the journalistic pieces are based to sustain their discourse, and, in the third section, the topics they address, while also analysing the frames adopted in each of these categories.

The Islamic Subject of Media Discourse

Table 2 shows the frames adopted by the newspapers whenever they refer to Islam or Muslims as a subject. The coverage mostly frames M&I as a subject unrelated to ‘us’ (exclusive frame). The data is all the more significant given that journalistic references regarding Muslim-majority countries have been excluded from this computation when addressing issues in which ‘us’ does not participate. Also noteworthy is the high percentage of records with a neutral frame, superior to the inclusive one. They are the occasions in which, when referring to M&I, it is not made explicit if they are considered part of or alien to ‘us.’

Table 2. Media frame of Muslims and Islam as ‘subject’: codified records of each frame (2017)

	3 dailies		<i>Abc</i>		<i>El País</i>		<i>La Vanguardia</i>	
	Records	%*	Records	%*	Records	%*	Records	%*
Inclusive frame	369	24.5%	104	17.6%	167	40.5%	98	19.5%
Neutral frame	403	26.8%	125	21.2%	114	27.7%	164	32.6%
Exclusive frame	734	48.7%	362	61.3%	131	31.8%	241	47.9%
Heterogeneous frame	543	27.9%	157	22.4%	170	31.4%	216	30.8%
Neutral frame	114	5.9%	35	5.0%	32	5.9%	47	6.7%
Homogeneous frame	1.287	66.2%	510	72.6%	339	62.7%	438	62.5%
Non-problematic frame	770	39.6%	197	28.1%	312	57.7%	261	37.3%
Neutral frame	400	20.6%	148	21.1%	98	18.1%	154	22.0%
Problematic frame	772	39.8%	356	50.8%	131	24.2%	285	40.7%
Total	5,392		1,994		1,494		1,904	

* Percentages of column and by group of frames.

Source: own elaboration.

As to the second trait of Islamophobia, the media mostly homogenises M&I. In this case, in addition, it is found that the neutral frame is not very present. On the contrary, and against the problematisation of the Islamic that characterises Western media coverage, in the Spanish case (1) there is a balance between problematic and non-problematic frames of the Islamic subject, and (2) the problematic frame is present to a lesser extent than the other two Islamophobic ones.

In a complementary way, the binary variants of each frame (inclusive vs. exclusive, etc.) do not only have a significant presence in the global calculation of media coverage, but also in the units that comprise it: all the frames are present in at least 32% of the 380 documents in which an explicit reference is made to the Islamic subject (see Table 2bis). The articles with the subject framed in an exclusive way predominate over those with entries framed inclusively. However, the texts that contain records with either the subject framed in a heterogeneous way – not all Muslims are the same – and/or non-problematic are more than their Islamophobic variant. There are, therefore, a diversity of frames, and it is not the Islamophobic ones that predominate. Regarding the greater frequency of homogenising records mentioned above, the analysis of their distribution indicates, finally, that those records are concentrated in just over a third of the articles.

Table 2bis. Media framing of Muslims and Islam as subject: documents with coded records of each frame (year 2017)

	3 dailies		<i>Abc</i>		<i>El País</i>		<i>La Vanguardia</i>	
	Documents	%*	Docs.	%*	Docs.	%*	Docs.	%*
Inclusive frame	123	32.4%	38	28.6%	40	35.4%	45	33.6%
Neutral frame	180	47.4%	72	54.1%	46	40.7%	62	46.3%
Exclusive frame	174	45.8%	57	42.9%	49	43.4%	68	50.7%
Heterogeneous frame	179	47.1%	53	39.8%	59	52.2%	67	50.0%
Neutral frame	329	86.6%	116	87.2%	92	81.4%	121	90.3%
Homogeneous frame	143	37.6%	42	31.6%	48	42.5%	53	39.6%
Non-problematic frame	248	65.3%	69	51.9%	87	77.0%	92	68.7%
Neutral frame	249	65.5%	97	72.9%	58	51.3%	94	70.1%
Problematic frame	204	53.7%	68	51.1%	54	47.8%	82	61.2%
Total	380		133		113		134	

* Percentage with respect to the total documents with subject records and by group of frames.

Source: own elaboration.

The disaggregation of register data by newspaper (Table 2) reveals relevant differences: in both ABC and LV the presence of each Islamophobic frame is greater than that of the integrative one, although the differences in percentage points between each binary variant are always superior in ABC (rightist and edited in Madrid) than in LV (centrist / Barcelona). On the contrary, EP (leftist / Madrid) reports on the Islamic subject with a predominance of inclusive and non-problematic frames. And, while the homogeneous records surpass the heterogeneous ones in EP as well, the difference in percentage points is the smallest of the three dailies.

The homogeneous frame does not always have a negative connotation. It is certainly wrong and harmful to refer to Muslims as an internally undifferentiated community. It is also true that they are occasionally referred to in such terms without any Islamophobic connotation. This was the case, for example, when the press quoted the Canadian prime minister as saying about an extreme right attack in Quebec that it was perpetrated “against the Muslim community.” He added: “we will stand with you”, and also: “you enrich our shared country in immeasurable ways.”¹⁶ In homogenising them, he expressed a conception of ‘us’ that included them (inclusive frame, therefore), and, far from seeing them as a problem, they were the object of a violence that he rejected (non-problematic frame).

The diversity of frames is also observed in Table 2bis: being all the frames present in the three newspapers, the frame that appears in less documents is present in at least 29% of them. While the three newspapers published more pieces containing records of exclusive frame than of inclusive one, the other two Islamophobic frames are less present than their integrative counterparts. Even though there are few differences between the dailies regarding the homogeneous/heterogeneous frame, the presence of non-problematic records is seen in 77% of EP documents, 29 points above the percentage of documents of the same newspaper with problematic records. In this respect, LV appears less integrative than EP, but more so than ABC, which balances the number of documents in which conflicting (n=68) and non-conflicting (n=69) frames are recorded.

¹⁶ ABC, 31-01-2017, p.26.

Voices and Sources in building the Islamic

In 350 out of our 432 documents, the media discourse is built on the basis of voices and sources (V&S hereinafter). They include public institutions and authorities, civil society members and leaders, experts, celebrities and anonymous or unknown people (vox populi). We have additionally differentiated V&S depending on whether they are Muslims or not, in order to check the extent to which Muslims' voice is shared with those exposed to the media.

Opinions of non-Muslims appear in 71% of the texts (see Table 3.1). Although the amount of those that give voice to the Muslims is lower, they are collected in more than half of the documents. Whether Muslim or not, institutional V&S predominate. The other actors are also present, especially civil society agents, followed by vox-pop. Non-Muslim institutions, in any case, are the unique actor present in more than half of the texts. By newspapers, Muslim V&S occur in less documents in ABC than in any other. The right-wing daily is also the one that leaves the actors without religious identity ascription in fewer texts and the one that incorporates non-Muslim institutional V&S to a larger extent. No significant differences appear between EP and LV. And, while both dailies expose their readers to Muslim V&S in at least 60% of their documents, the texts with non-Muslims V&S are at least 13 points below the coverage that gives them ABC.

Table 3.1. Voices and sources in the coverage of the Islamic (year 2017)

		3 dailies		<i>Abc</i>		<i>El Pais</i>		<i>La Vanguardia</i>	
		Documents*		Docs.*		Docs.*		Docs.*	
		Total	%**	Total	%***	Total	%***	Total	%***
Non-Muslims	Institutional	121	34.6%	43	37.4%	33	30.0%	45	36.0%
	Civil society	115	32.9%	25	21.7%	45	40.9%	45	36.0%
	Experts	38	10.9%	10	8.7%	12	10.9%	16	12.8%
	Celebrities	28	8.0%	4	3.5%	13	11.8%	11	8.8%
	Vox-pop	82	23.4%	20	17.4%	32	29.1%	30	24.0%
	Total	201	57.4%	57	49.6%	66	60.0%	78	62.4%
Undefined identity	Institutional	45	12.9%	5	4.3%	12	10.9%	28	22.4%
	Civil society	40	11.4%	3	2.6%	16	14.5%	21	16.8%
	Experts	22	6.3%	2	1.7%	5	4.5%	15	12.0%
	Celebrities	10	2.9%	2	1.7%	4	3.6%	4	3.2%
	Vox-pop	37	10.6%	6	5.2%	17	15.5%	14	11.2%
	Total	68	19.4%	19	16.5%	22	20.0%	37	29.6%
Non-Muslims	Institutional	185	52.9%	72	62.6%	56	50.9%	57	45.6%
	Civil society	92	26.3%	27	23.5%	31	28.2%	34	27.2%
	Experts	57	16.3%	20	17.4%	14	12.7%	23	18.4%
	Celebrities	28	8.0%	10	8.7%	10	9.1%	8	6.4%
	Vox-pop	80	22.9%	22	19.1%	30	27.3%	28	22.4%
	Total	248	70.9%	93	80.9%	75	68.2%	80	64.0%
Total		350		115		110		125	

* Documents with coded records of voices and sources (V&S).

** Percentages with respect to the total of documents with V&S records (N=350).

*** Percentages with respect to the total of documents with V&S records of each newspaper (N_{ABC}=115, N_{EP}=110 y N_{LV}=125)

Source: own elaboration.

The inclusive and the exclusive frames have a balanced presence, although non-Muslim V&S stand out with an exclusive discourse (see Table 3.2). The predominance of the Islamophobic frame is greater when attending to the homogeneous/heterogeneous frames, with a presence of non-Muslim V&S much more accentuated in this case (61% of documents). On the contrary, the problematic frame does not predominate. It is rather balanced with the non-problematic one. ABC is less inclusive than LV, which in turn is less inclusive than EP. Actually, the leftist daily is the most inclusive regardless of whether V&S are Muslim or non-Muslim. Even so, the three are more exclusive than

inclusive, and it is LV that publishes the greatest number of documents with V&S in Islamophobic frame. In line with the inclusive frame, EP is also the newspaper that covers Muslims as a heterogeneous collective in more texts in relative terms. It follows LV. ABC incorporates such V&S in less than a third of its documents.

Once again EP is the most integrative when considering the non-problematic frame, followed by LV, which nevertheless is the most Islamophobic regarding the problematic frame, that is, LV is the newspaper that publishes the highest percentage of documents with V&S holding a problematising discourse of M&I. In line with what the data indicate in relation to the dichotomous pairs inclusive/exclusive and heterogeneous/homogeneous, both ABC and LV present higher percentages in the Islamophobic component of the problematic/non-problematic pair than in the integrative one. On the contrary, EP, with V&S problematising M&I in 60% of the documents, increases the percentage significantly to 84% of the texts where V&S frame the Islamic in a non-problematic way.

That there is at least one specific record in a given document does not imply that there are many more. Hence the relevance of also attending to the records themselves as a whole. Table 3.3. reveals, in line with the above, that EP is the most inclusive newspaper, as well as the least exclusive. It is also the one that mostly projects a heterogeneous image of M&I. Homogeneous representation predominates in the three media, especially in ABC, which is also the most exclusive daily. Regarding the third dichotomy of frames, ABC is not only the media outlet that offers the most problematic image of M&I. It is also the only newspaper that builds its discourse relying more on the V&S to frame the Islamic in a mostly problematic way. It is worth noting, however, that its non-problematic records reach almost 40% and that the problematising entries barely exceed 45%. EP is the only one that offers a percentage of non-problematic records higher than 50% and of problematic ones below 25%.

Table 3.3. Islamic media framing: coded records of voices and sources (year 2017)

	3 dailies		Abc		El Pais		La Vanguardia					
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%				
Inclusive frame	1,696	453	26.7%	498	140	28.1%	535	172	32.1%	663	141	21.3%
Neutral frame		639	37.7%		162	32.5%		192	35.9%		285	43.0%
Exclusive frame		604	35.6%		196	39.4%		171	32.0%		237	35.7%
Heterogeneous frame	2,270	638	28.1%	648	116	17.9%	733	238	32.5%	889	284	31.9%
Neutral frame		447	19.7%		136	21.0%		143	19.5%		168	18.9%
Homogeneous frame		1,185	52.2%		396	61.1%		352	48.0%		437	49.2%
Non-problematic frame	2,270	1,122	49.4%	650	257	39.5%	734	428	58.3%	886	437	49.3%
Neutral frame		372	16.4%		100	15.4%		125	17.0%		147	16.6%
Problematic frame		776	34.2%		293	45.1%		181	24.7%		302	34.1%

* Percentages of column and by group of frames.

Source: own elaboration.

The Thematic Agenda of the Islamic and its Framing

The documents have also been coded by countries or sets of them. Spain barely represents 20% of the media coverage of M&I throughout the entire year (see Table 4). The percentage rises to less than 70% if the territorial horizon of ‘us’ is expanded to the West. 40% of the texts do not report about other geographic and cultural realities at large, but, to be precise, to Islamised news on international issues unrelated to ‘us.’ It implies that, even if the newspapers cover other events of Muslim-majority countries or that affect Muslims, no reference is made to their religious identity in reporting. Hence, the coverage of those events is not part of our database.

No significant imbalances are observed between the components of each binary frames. It should be pointed out, nonetheless, that a) the proportion of exclusive texts is high (81%) only when it comes to news about the non-Western world; b) the homogenising frame predominates in the coverage about Spain and the West, and c) Spain and the West are framed to a greater extent in the non-problematic way, while the problematising and non-problematising coverage of M&I is balanced when addressing non-Western territories. Finally, it is significant the scarce presence of exclusive texts when dealing with Spanish news, and, secondly, that almost 45% of the records of such dichotomous frames respond to a third one, i.e., the neutral frame. Thus, when reporting about people because of their Muslimness, they are not rejected as strangers, but neither are they included as members of ‘us.’

The topics covered in more news (see Table 4) are those related to religious clothing, those which explicitly consider Islam relationship vis-à-vis ‘us,’ and those referred to both the violence of ‘them’ and the violence against ‘them.’ The texts on Islam as a religion in general, on women in Islam, on mosques and imams, on President Trump, on elections, and explicitly referring to Islamophobia are also above the median. A greater predominance of the Islamophobic frames is observed in considering the topics one by one. Once again, however, the press does not problematise M&I: the non-problematic frame is superior to the problematic one in half of the topics – in most of them, by more than 20 percentage points, higher in the case of news about Islamophobia and in which, without using such a term, some form of violence suffered by people for being Muslims is reported. M&I are portrayed as problematic especially in the news on cultural issues.

Considering that we codify the core theme or themes of each document, only ABC and LV get to devote more than 20% of their texts to a given topic – the violence of Muslims. In combining the documents about the violence that Muslims suffer and the documents that explicitly allude to Islamophobia, the three newspapers address the topic in more than 20% of their coverage, although EP is the only one that does it in more than 30% of its coverage.

None of the newspapers biases its coverage by adopting a unique frame (see Table 4bis), not even on whether the Muslims are part of ‘us’ or not. That is not against the evidence that the exclusive and the homogenising frames predominate, both of them slightly more so in ABC than in EP and LV. The most significant differences between the three newspapers are seen again on whether M&I entail a problem or not. On the one hand, it is the dilemma in which the media expose the public to an imprecise image (neutral frame) to a lesser extent. On the other hand, EP is the daily with the least problematic coverage. It is also the one that frames in a non-problematic way to the largest extent, both in its full coverage and when covers the topics to which it pays more attention.

Table 4. Islamic media framing: proportion of documents coded by topics and territories (*Abc, El País* and *La Vanguardia*. 2017)*

		Records		Inclusive frame	Neutral frame	Exclusive frame	Heterogeneous frame	Neutral frame	Homogeneous frame	Non-problematic frame	Neutral frame	Problematic frame
		Total	%**									
Topics	Islam (religion)	39	9.0%	16.7%	30.0%	53.3%	43.6%	0.0%	56.4%	34.1%	17.1%	48.8%
	Interreligious dialogue (with Islam)	23	5.3%	11.1%	16.7%	72.2%	39.1%	8.7%	52.2%	45.8%	29.2%	25.0%
	Islam vs. 'us'	68	15.7%	26.6%	14.1%	59.4%	29.0%	1.4%	69.6%	31.5%	12.3%	56.2%
	Woman	48	11.1%	35.7%	35.7%	28.6%	39.6%	12.5%	47.9%	29.6%	14.8%	55.6%
	Clothing	70	16.2%	23.2%	51.8%	25.0%	22.9%	35.7%	41.4%	38.3%	13.6%	48.1%
	Family	14	3.2%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	57.1%	0.0%	42.9%	31.3%	18.8%	50.0%
	Public moral	27	6.3%	60.0%	40.0%	0.0%	48.1%	14.8%	37.0%	14.3%	7.1%	78.6%
	Other religious or cultural practices	8	1.9%	40.0%	0.0%	60.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	37.5%	0.0%	62.5%
	Freedom of expression	2	0.5%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%
	Mosques and/or imams	55	12.7%	40.4%	36.2%	23.4%	32.7%	14.5%	52.7%	43.3%	23.3%	33.3%
	Mosque of Cordoba	6	1.4%	0.0%	33.3%	66.7%	0.0%	16.7%	83.3%	0.0%	33.3%	66.7%
	Laicism	4	0.9%	0.0%	75.0%	25.0%	25.0%	25.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Islamophobia	44	10.2%	28.6%	47.6%	23.8%	15.9%	6.8%	77.3%	84.8%	6.5%	8.7%
	Violence against them	66	15.3%	33.3%	12.5%	54.2%	29.2%	3.1%	67.7%	76.1%	10.4%	13.4%
	Violence of them	84	19.4%	17.2%	35.9%	46.9%	46.4%	8.3%	45.2%	23.7%	8.6%	67.7%
	Trump	36	8.3%	8.3%	13.9%	77.8%	25.0%	0.0%	75.0%	58.3%	13.9%	27.8%
	Pontifical visits	26	6.0%	5.3%	5.3%	89.5%	53.8%	11.5%	34.6%	42.9%	21.4%	35.7%
Elections	42	9.7%	39.4%	18.2%	42.4%	23.8%	2.4%	73.8%	44.4%	17.8%	37.8%	
Sport	11	2.5%	20.0%	30.0%	50.0%	9.1%	27.3%	63.6%	63.6%	0.0%	36.4%	
Refugees	15	3.5%	0.0%	13.3%	86.7%	0.0%	13.3%	86.7%	53.3%	20.0%	26.7%	
Other	19	4.4%	25.0%	62.5%	12.5%	31.6%	21.1%	47.4%	60.0%	25.0%	15.0%	
Territories	Spain	88	20.4%	30.0%	42.2%	27.8%	19.3%	19.3%	61.4%	45.3%	17.9%	36.8%
	The West***	297	68.8%	26.5%	36.0%	37.5%	19.3%	13.1%	67.6%	47.1%	14.4%	38.6%
	Rest of countries***	172	39.8%	4.1%	15.1%	80.8%	47.2%	8.8%	44.0%	36.9%	18.2%	44.8%

* Percentages of row and by group of frames.

** Percentages of column.

*** The Western countries reported in relation to the Islamic are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Hungary, Israel, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and United States. In addition to Spain, we also include the Vatican and allusions to the West, Europe or Christianity as an explicit referent in the media narrative, as well as news about the European Union and its institutions (most of them on judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning the use of hijab and nicab).

**** The other registered countries are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Central African Republic, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The explicit references to the "Islamic world" are also counted.

Source: own elaboration.

There are fewer differences between ABC and LV than with EP, although a somewhat more Islamophobic coverage is observed in the first one. For example, if both dailies opt for the problematic frame of Muslim women and clothing, LV matches with EP in considering the relationship between Islam and ‘us’ in a largely non-problematic way, and balances its coverage of mosques and imams between the problematic frame – to which ABC tends – and the non-problematic one. In line with these results, ABC transmits to its readers a negative image of M&I regardless of whether news are relative to Spain, extend to the West or refer to the rest of territories. EP mostly frames M&I as non-problematic regardless of the territory at stake, resulting LV in an intermediate position (see Table 4bis).

The attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils do not appear as a topic because the news about terrorism have been excluded in this study. However, the press addressed collateral issues to both the perpetration of the August crimes and the consequent state response. In fact, we noted above that, taken together, such issues received the most media attention. No other topic has deserved so much coverage in a concentrated space of time and by the three newspapers in unison. Between August 18 (the day after the attacks in Barcelona city) and September 5, 37 out of the 51 news in our database were related to the attacks. In line with what might be expected from the reaction of the Western press to jihadist attacks, ABC (n=6) adopted a mostly exclusive, homogeneous and problematic frame in a greater percentage of texts during those days than in the seven and a half previous months. On the contrary, LV (n=15) turned from largely exclusive and problematic framing to portray M&I primarily in an inclusive and non-problematic way, although in percentages slightly lower than EP (n=16). Finally, ABC reduced the percentage of pieces with problematic frame after the period of coverage of the attacks (from 64% to 45%), just three points above the pieces framing M&I in a non-problematic manner. Both EP (over 50%) and LV continued to favour the non-problematic framing of M&I.

Conclusions

It is not strange to encounter the question of why a xenophobic organization has not gained parliamentary strength in Spain, contrary to the success of them in a large part of Europe (Alonso and Rovira, 2015).¹⁷ As to the rejection of M&I, opinion polls show that this is a less widespread attitude in Spain than among its counterparts. A recent Pew survey (2018) indicates, e.g., that it is the sixth European country (and the first among the Mediterranean ones), with more people saying (74%) that they would accept Muslims in their family (see also Dennison and Dražanová, 2018). One contributing factor in the receptive attitude of Spaniards towards those who profess Islam could be mass media. Our analysis of the Spanish media discourse supports the hypothesis.

We have analysed whether the opinion and the attitude that the press tends to shape is Islamophobic or integrative. For this we have attended to the extent to which it opts, respectively, for the exclusive vs. inclusive, homogenising vs heterogenising, and problematising or not of M&I. It has been done taking into consideration both the total coverage records and the documents in which these records appear in relation to the categories ‘subject’ – references to the Islamic subject – and ‘voices and sources’ – which

¹⁷ This study was conducted and concluded prior to the 2018 Andalusian elections, as a result of which Vox, a far-right formation, won 12 seats in the regional Parliament, and prior to the 2019 general elections (24 seats). In the absence of due research, the media coverage of the candidacy seems to have focused on issues other than its Islamophobic discourse.

the media use to shape the image of reality in reporting. The third category analysed was the news topics.

The empirical evidence shows that there is no incitement to violent action against Muslims; it is not a racist media discourse directed against the Muslim ‘other.’ An image of rejection of the Islamic is projected, nonetheless, to the point of being possible to read definitions of the hijab as a “castrator veil”¹⁸ and of Islam as an “ideology of imposition”¹⁹ as well as categorical statements such as “they do not try to integrate themselves into Spanish society.”²⁰ In fact, most ‘subject’ records see Muslims as a stranger or outsider (exclusive frame) belonging to a community of undifferentiated peers (homogeneous frame). As a result, there is a racist discourse about the Islamised ‘other.’ However, if on the one hand the different integrative frames suppose at least a quarter of the coverage, the non-problematic one equals the problematic one. In the case of V&S, the presence of the former is even larger.

To sum up, the Spanish media coverage is more homogenising than exclusive, although it presents both Islamophobic traits. On the other hand, it is more balanced in its framing of M&I as a problem, and in fact it tends to portray the Islamic as non-problematic. The democratic principle of pluralism of information is translated, in any case, into a plurality of frames. Thus, while the H2 is confirmed, the H1 is qualified. This is all the more so because the diversity of frames is accompanied by a plurality of V&S: both institutional and non-institutional, and both Muslim and non-Muslim. In this regard, it can be concluded, on the one hand, that there is no silencing or exclusion of either Muslim or extra-institutional V&S. On the other, that, even though both institutional and non-Muslim V&S predominate, and even though they are mostly framed Islamophobically, it occurs again with the exception of the problematic frame.

H3 and H4 are also confirmed: centrist LV appears less integrative than leftist EP, but more so than right-wing ABC, from which it can be inferred that, being ideology important, territoriality is not a relevant factor to explain framing of M&I. Regarding EP it is worth adding that it is also the newspaper that Islamises contents to the lesser extent, both by the number of published news and by the total amount of words of its coverage, but also by the volume of opinion entries. Even though LV and ABC publish more news than EP, what is published by each of them is reduced to less than one third of the days of the year – less than a quarter in the case of ABC and EP. In the absence of comparative elements with other media systems, it allows to deduce, perhaps not disinterest in M&I issues, but willingness not to Islamise the public agenda. The hypothesis would be supported by the low percentage of news specifically related to the Spanish reality. It remains open for future research.

The analysis of the media topics corroborates the conclusions reached so far and allows to validate H5. The news published in the context of the attacks of August have been particularly enlightening: at a critical juncture, for it was susceptible to racist reactions (Islamophobic on this occasion), both EP and LV opted for reducing the presence of the Islamophobic frames and for increasing the integrative ones in addressing the multiple aspects they covered vis-à-vis their previous coverage of M&I. ABC opted for a more Islamophobic discourse than the one it was holding so far. At the same time, nonetheless, the right-wing daily reduced its coverage to less than half the number of pieces of the

¹⁸ ABC, 22-5-17, p.76.

¹⁹ LV, 18-3-17, p.23.

²⁰ ABC, 27-8-17, p.3.

other two newspapers; that is, it became more Islamophobic while, potentially neutralising its social and political impact, Islamised to a lesser extent.

Taking together the diversity of frames and the differences pointed out among the newspapers, the Spanish press projects a rather homogeneous image of M&I and tends to shape it as a strange 'other,' explicitly or implicitly excluded from 'us.' It would not be contributing, therefore, to the inclusion of Muslims as a perceived part of an actually pluralistic or multicultural society. But neither can be said of the media discourse that is fuelling fears, tensions or hostilities towards M&I. Rather, the Islamic dimension of reality appears as an issue that is avoided, firstly, in avoiding the Islamisation of subjects and topics and, secondly, by the relevant presence of the neutral frame in Islamised coverage. This kind of silence could help to understand the absence of rejection by Spanish public opinion, the Bourdieu's 'habitus' that would be contributing to shape, but such a silence could also be implying an absence of knowledge of the equal 'other' with which 'we' live more and more on this side of the Mediterranean.

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Appendix: Tables

Table 3.2. Voices and sources in the media framing of the Islamic (year 2017)

		3 dailies			ABC	EP	LV	
		Docs.*	Docs.	%**	Docs.*	Docs.*	Docs.*	
Inclusive frame	Muslims	75 (21.4%)	Institutional	46	61.3%	21 (19.6%)	28 (41.2%)	26 (28.0%)
			Civil society	51	68.0%			
			Experts	15	20.0%			
			Celebrities	9	12.0%			
			Vox-pop	38	50.7%			
	Undefined	25 (7.1%)			3 (2.8%)	9 (13.2%)	13 (14.0%)	
	Non-Muslims	106 (30.3%)	Institutional	81	76.4%	34 (31.8%)	33 (48.5%)	39 (41.9%)
			Civil society	47	44.3%			
			Experts	20	18.9%			
			Celebrities	13	12.3%			
Vox-pop			38	35.8%				
Neutral frame	Muslims	92 (26.3%)	Institutional	56	60.9%	27 (25.2%)	26 (38.2%)	39 (41.9%)
			Civil society	60	65.2%			
			Experts	20	21.7%			
			Celebrities	11	12.0%			
			Vox-pop	48	52.2%			
	Undefined	37 (10.6%)			3 (2.8%)	11 (16.2%)	23 (24.7%)	
	Non-Muslims	133 (38.0%)	Institutional	105	78.9%	43 (40.2%)	42 (61.8%)	48 (51.6%)
			Civil society	56	42.1%			
			Experts	33	24.8%			
			Celebrities	12	9.0%			
Vox-pop			51	38.3%				
Exclusive frame	Muslims	76 (21.7%)	Institutional	49	64.5%	44 (41.1%)	34 (50.0%)	61 (65.6%)
			Civil society	41	53.9%			
			Experts	20	26.3%			
			Celebrities	11	14.5%			
			Vox-pop	31	40.8%			
	Undefined	23 (6.6%)			8 (7.5%)	15 (22.1%)	26 (28.0%)	
	Non-Muslims	133 (38.0%)	Institutional	93	69.9%	54 (50.5%)	32 (47.1%)	53 (57.0%)
			Civil society	50	37.6%			
			Experts	38	28.6%			
			Celebrities	16	12.0%			
Vox-pop			42	31.6%				
Total***		350			107	68	93	

* In parentheses, percentages with respect to the the total number of documents with voice and source (V&S) records.

** Percentages with respect to the total of documents with corresponding Muslim or non-Muslim V&S records (third column on the left). Thus, for example, the 46 documents in which Muslim and institutional VyF appear with an inclusive frame account for 61.3% of the 75 documents with Muslim VyF framed that way.

*** Total of documents with V&S records.

Source: own elaboration.

Table 3.2. Cont.

	3 dailies					ABC	EP	LV
		Docs.*		Docs.		Docs.*		Docs.
Heterogeneous frame	Muslims	128 (36.6%)	Institutional	79	61.7%	34 (31.8%)	44 (64.7%)	50 (53.8%)
			Civil society	78	60.9%			
			Experts	28	21.9%			
			Celebrities	15	11.7%			
			Vox-pop	52	40.6%			
	Undefined	37 (10.6%)				4 (3.7%)	13 (19.1%)	20 (21.5%)
	Non-Muslims	109 (31.1%)	Institutional	80	73.4%	34 (31.8%)	36 (52.9%)	39 (41.9%)
			Civil society	51	46.8%			
			Experts	31	28.4%			
			Celebrities	12	11.0%			
Vox-pop			41	37.6%				
Neutral frame	Muslims	113 (32.3%)	Institutional	77	68.1%	31 (29.0%)	40 (58.8%)	42 (45.2%)
			Civil society	74	65.5%			
			Experts	21	18.6%			
			Celebrities	14	12.4%			
			Vox-pop	51	45.1%			
	Undefined	44 (12.6%)				5 (4.7%)	13 (19.1%)	26 (28.0%)
	Non-Muslims	116 (33.1%)	Institutional	94	81.0%	39 (36.4%)	36 (52.9%)	41 (44.1%)
			Civil society	56	48.3%			
			Experts	28	24.1%			
			Celebrities	11	9.5%			
Vox-pop			44	37.9%				
Homogeneous frame	Muslims	158 (45.1%)	Institutional	98	62.0%	47 (43.9%)	45 (66.2%)	66 (71.0%)
			Civil society	86	54.4%			
			Experts	36	22.8%			
			Celebrities	24	15.2%			
			Vox-pop	66	41.8%			
	Undefined	53 (15.1%)				6 (5.6%)	17 (25.0%)	30 (32.3%)
	Non-Muslims	214 (61.1%)	Institutional	160	74.8%	79 (73.8%)	65 (95.6%)	70 (75.3%)
			Civil society	81	37.9%			
			Experts	52	24.3%			
			Celebrities	24	11.2%			
Vox-pop			74	34.6%				
Total***		350				107	68	93

* In parentheses, percentages with respect to the total number of documents with voice and source (V&S) records.

** Percentages with respect to the total of documents with corresponding Muslim or non-Muslim V&S records (third column on the left). Thus, for example, the 46 documents in which Muslim and institutional VyF appear with an inclusive frame account for 61.3% of the 75 documents with Muslim VyF framed that way.

*** Total of documents with V&S records.

Source: own elaboration.

Table 3.2. Cont.

		3 dailies				ABC	EP	LV
		Docs.*		Docs.		Docs.*		Docs.
Non-problematic frame	Muslims	138 (39.4%)	Institutional	86	62.3%	35 (32.7%)	49 (72.1%)	54 (58.1%)
			Civil society	80	58.0%			
			Experts	27	19.6%			
			Celebrities	22	15.9%			
			Vox-pop	63	45.7%			
	Undefined	31 (8.9%)				3 (2.8%)	18 (26.5%)	30 (32.3%)
	Non-Muslims	169 (48.3%)	Institutional	131	77.5%	55 (51.4%)	57 (83.8%)	60 (64.5%)
			Civil society	70	41.4%			
			Experts	34	20.1%			
			Celebrities	16	9.5%			
Vox-pop			61	36.1%				
Neutral frame	Muslims	139 (39.7%)	Institutional	91	65.5%	39 (36.4%)	38 (55.9%)	62 (66.7%)
			Civil society	87	62.6%			
			Experts	32	23.0%			
			Celebrities	17	12.2%			
			Vox-pop	56	40.3%			
	Undefined	48 (13.7%)				5 (4.7%)	14 (20.6%)	29 (31.2%)
	Non-Muslims	143 (40.9%)	Institutional	109	76.2%	49 (45.8%)	40 (58.8%)	54 (58.1%)
			Civil society	65	45.5%			
			Experts	42	29.4%			
			Celebrities	18	12.6%			
Vox-pop			50	35.0%				
Problematic frame	Muslims	139 (39.7%)	Institutional	85	61.2%	44 (41.1%)	34 (50.0%)	61 (65.6%)
			Civil society	83	59.7%			
			Experts	29	20.9%			
			Celebrities	18	12.9%			
			Vox-pop	57	41.0%			
	Undefined	49 (14.0%)				8 (7.5%)	15 (22.1%)	26 (28.0%)
	Non-Muslims	165 (47.1%)	Institutional	122	73.9%	66 (61.7%)	41 (60.3%)	58 (62.4%)
			Civil society	68	41.2%			
			Experts	46	27.9%			
			Celebrities	19	11.5%			
Vox-pop			56	33.9%				
Total***		350				107	68	93

* In parentheses, percentages with respect to the total number of documents with voice and source (V&S) records.

** Percentages with respect to the total of documents with corresponding Muslim or non-Muslim V&S records (third column on the left). Thus, for example, the 46 documents in which Muslim and institutional VyF appear with an inclusive frame account for 61.3% of the 75 documents with Muslim VyF framed that way.

*** Total of documents with V&S records.

Source: own elaboration.

Table 4bis. Islamic media framing: documents coded by either topic or territory and by newspaper (year 2017)*

	Inclusive frame	Neutral frame	Exclusive frame	Heterogeneous frame	Neutral frame	Homogeneous frame	Non-problematic frame	Neutral frame	Problematic frame
Islam (religion)		LV (→9)	ABC (58) EP (29)	EP (40)		ABC (54) LV (12.5)	EP (10)		ABC (33) LV (12.5)
Interreligious dialogue (with Islam)			ABC (83) EP (100) LV (40)	ABC (12.5) EP (⇒)**	EP (⇒)**	EP (⇒)** LV (33)	ABC (37.5) EP (67) LV ((38.5%))***		LV ((38.5%))***
Islam vs. 'us'			ABC (76) EP (6) LV (5)			ABC (70) EP (35) LV (9)	EP (9.5) LV (4)		ABC (75)
Woman	LV (10)	(←33) EP	ABC (22)	EP (23) LV ((48%))		ABC (50) LV ((48%))	EP (13)		ABC (60) LV (29)
Clothing		ABC EP LV		LV ((39%))	EP (→6) LV ((39%))	ABC (50)	EP (21)		ABC (31) LV (4)
Family	LV (100)			ABC (100) EP (100)		LV (33)			ABC (100) EP (20) LV (10)
Public moral	EP (100) LV (100)	ABC		ABC (33) EP (14)		LV (9)			ABC (67) EP (75) LV (54)
Other religious or cultural practices	ABC (100)		EP (33) LV (100)			ABC (100) EP (100) LV (100)	ABC (100)		EP (20) LV (100)
Freedom of expression		EP				EP (100)	EP (50)		
Mosques and/or imams	ABC (6) EP (26)	(←9) LV				ABC (29) EP (9) LV (19)	EP (36) LV ((42.9%))		ABC (12) LV ((42.9%))
Mosque of Cordoba		LV	ABC (80)			ABC (80) LV (100)		LV	ABC (80)
Laicism		ABC (→22) LV		ABC (⇒)	ABC (⇒)	ABC (⇒) LV (100)			ABC (100) LV (100)
Islamophobia		(←17) ABC EP LV				ABC (100) EP (70) LV (65)	ABC (86) EP (85) LV (63)		
Violence against <i>them</i>		(←37.5) ABC	EP (47) LV (33)			ABC (46) EP (17) LV (80)	ABC (56) EP (71) LV (62.5)		
Violence of <i>them</i>		LV	ABC (46) EP (54)	LV (30)		ABC (25) EP (5)			ABC (74) EP (21) LV (28)
Trump			ABC (90) EP (67) LV (57)			ABC (60) EP (50) LV (43)	EP (58) LV (50)		ABC (30)
Pontifical visits			ABC (92) EP (100) LV (60)	ABC (12) EP (50) LV (20)			ABC (11) EP (25)		LV (17)
Elections	EP (8) LV (25)		ABC (19)			ABC (87.5) EP (40) LV (9)	ABC (28)		EP (6) LV (9)
Sport		LV (→17)	ABC (33) EP (100)			ABC (100) EP (100) LV (50)	ABC (33) EP ((50%)) LV (33)		EP ((50%))

Topics

Table 4bis. Cont.

		Inclusive frame	Neutral frame	Exclusive frame	Heterogeneous frame	Neutral frame	Homogeneous frame	Non-problematic frame	Neutral frame	Problematic frame
	Refugees			ABC (100) EP (83) LV (80)			ABC (100) EP (83) LV (80)	EP (33) LV (40)	ABC	
	Other	ABC (100)	EP (→33) (←50) LV		EP (43)		ABC (100) LV (40)	ABC (100) EP (71) LV (18)		
Territories	Spain	EP ((35%))	ABC (→5) EP ((35%)) (4←) LV				ABC (67) EP (26) LV (19)	EP (74) LV (27)		ABC (40.5)
	The West		(8←) EP (→8) LV (→13)	ABC (25)			ABC (67) EP (38) LV (34)	EP (39) LV (21)		ABC (24)
	Rest of countries			ABC (96) EP (68) LV (62.5)	EP (53)		ABC (10) LV (1)	EP (19)		ABC (20) LV (20)

* For each group of frames, the predominant frame in each newspaper is recorded for the corresponding subject or territory. The difference in percentage points with the corresponding binary frame is indicated in parentheses. In case the predominant frame is the neutral one, the second frame with more records is indicated by an arrow; the difference is shown in parentheses if the difference between the binary frames is greater than 10 points. If a newspaper is not consigned in a given combination it is because there is no registered data for it. The topics in which the records of the newspaper and topic at stake are above the median of that newspaper by topics are highlighted in bold.

** The equal sign in parentheses indicates that the records are evenly distributed among the three variants of a given group of frames, neutral one included

*** The percentages that coincide between two variants of a given group of frames are shown in double parentheses.

Source: own elaboration.