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dc.contributor.authorRopero García, Miguel Ángel
dc.date.accessioned2016-11-14T10:40:07Z
dc.date.available2016-11-14T10:40:07Z
dc.date.created2016
dc.date.issued2016-11-14
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10630/12372
dc.description.abstractThis article analyses price competition in a two-period duopoly model in which only one firm knows the degree of substitutability between products. Using a Hotelling model, we analyse the informed firm´s incentive to reveal its private information throughout its price set in period 1. In this setting, the price set by the informed firm only reveals the degree of product differentiation in period 1 when the prior probability of closer substitutes is sufficiently high and the discount factor is sufficiently low. Finally, we find that firms differentiate their products as far as possible under asymmetric information.es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.subjectHostelería - Precioses_ES
dc.subject.otherAsymmetric informationes_ES
dc.subject.otherDegree of substitutability between productses_ES
dc.subject.otherDemand uncertaintyes_ES
dc.subject.otherSignalling gamees_ES
dc.subject.otherUndefeated equilibriumes_ES
dc.titleA duopoly game under uncertainty about product differentiation: A separating or pooling equilibrium?es_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/preprintes_ES
dc.centroFacultad de Turismoes_ES
dc.cclicenseby-nc-ndes_ES


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