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dc.contributor.authorPavoni, Nicola
dc.contributor.authorAuster, Sarah
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-07T10:59:52Z
dc.date.available2017-07-07T10:59:52Z
dc.date.created2017
dc.date.issued2017-07-07
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10630/14156
dc.description.abstractWe study the delegation problem between an investor and a financial intermediary. The intermediary has private information about the state of the world that determines the return of the investment. Moreover, he has superior awareness of the available investment opportunities and decides whether to reveal some of them to the investor. We show that the intermediary generally has incentives to make the investor aware of investment opportunities at the extremes, e.g. very risky and very safe projects, while leaving the investor unaware of intermediate investment options. We study how the extent to which the intermediary reveals available investment opportunities to the investor depends on the investor's initial awareness and the degree of competition between intermediaries in the market.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipUniversidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech.es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.subjectCréditoes_ES
dc.subjectEmpresas - Finanzases_ES
dc.titleOptimal Delegation, Unawareness, and Financial Intermediationes_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectes_ES
dc.centroFacultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresarialeses_ES
dc.relation.eventtitleSeminarios de Teoría Económicaes_ES
dc.relation.eventplaceFacultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresarialeses_ES
dc.relation.eventdate21/04/17es_ES
dc.cclicenseby-nc-ndes_ES


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