Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem
Coordinated and uncoordinated punishment in a team investment game
dc.contributor.author | Calabuig, Vicente | |
dc.contributor.author | Jiménez‑Jiménez, Natalia | |
dc.contributor.author | Olcina, Gonzalo | |
dc.contributor.author | Rodríguez-Lara, Ismael | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-03-01T10:52:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-03-01T10:52:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024-02-24 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Calabuig, V., Jiménez-Jiménez, N., Olcina, G. et al. Coordinated and uncoordinated punishment in a team investment game. Theory Decis (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-024-09977-9 | es_ES |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10630/30723 | |
dc.description.abstract | Coordinated punishment occurs when punishment requires a specific number of punishers to be effective, otherwise, no damage will be inflicted on the target. While societies often rely on this punishment device, its benefits are unclear compared to uncoordinated punishment, where punishment decisions are substitutes. In this paper, we compare the efficacy of coordinated and uncoordinated punishment in a team investment game with two investors and one allocator. Our findings indicate that coordinated punishment results in higher levels of cooperation and reciprocity, as measured by the levels of joint investment and the return by allocators. Importantly, this does not translate into higher payoffs: investors use punishment more frequently when this is coordinated, which destroys the efficiency gains generated by the highest investment. In fact, our results suggest that the highest level of efficiency would be achieved if investors were not allowed to punish. | es_ES |
dc.description.sponsorship | Funding for open access charge: Universidad de Málaga/CBUA. The authors acknowledge funding from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competetiveness under the research projects ECO2011‐29230, from the Spanish Science Ministry, grant number PID2021‐128228NB‐I00. Vicente Calabuig acknowledges also the support of the Conselleria d ́Innovació, Universitats, Ciencia i Societat Digital, Generalitat Valenciana, grant number AICO/2021/257. Natalia Jiménez-Jiménez acknowledges also funding from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2016-76789P) and from Fundación BBVA for the project “El efecto del descenso de la productividad de las clases privilegiadas en el voto de las clases humildes” (Ayudas Fundación BBVA Investigadores y Creadores Culturales 2015). Also, this manuscript is part of the R&D and Innovation project PID2022-139843NB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033. Ismael Rodriguez-Lara has received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (PGC2018-097875-A-I00 and PID2022-142943NB-I00), Proyectos de I + D + i del programa operativo FEDER 2020 Andalucía (B‐SEJ‐206‐UGR20), and Proyectos de I + D + i Junta de Andalucía 2020 (P20_00069). Finally, Gonzalo Olcina acknowledges support of Conselleria de Innovación, Universidades, Ciencia y Sociedad Digital of the Generalitat Valenciana under the Excellence Program Prometeo PROMETEO 2023 - CIPROM/2022/029. | es_ES |
dc.language.iso | eng | es_ES |
dc.publisher | Springer Nature | es_ES |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es_ES |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | * |
dc.subject | Inversiones | es_ES |
dc.subject | Economía | es_ES |
dc.subject.other | Team investment game | es_ES |
dc.subject.other | Coordinated punishment | es_ES |
dc.subject.other | Uncoordinated punishment | es_ES |
dc.subject.other | Cooperation | es_ES |
dc.subject.other | Joint investment | es_ES |
dc.subject.other | Reciprocity | es_ES |
dc.subject.other | Efciency | es_ES |
dc.title | Coordinated and uncoordinated punishment in a team investment game | es_ES |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | es_ES |
dc.centro | Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales | es_ES |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11238-024-09977-9 | |
dc.rights.cc | Atribución 4.0 Internacional | * |
dc.type.hasVersion | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | es_ES |