The question of a realist foundation of morality will soon be shifted to the question of the justification and truth of moral judgments, assuming that, in some cases, an answer to this last question serves the purposes of the first. In this line of thought, contemporary moral realists believe that their proposals on the truth of moral statements serve the foundational concerns.
From a realist perspective some have questioned in recent times the plausibility of ‘kantian’ foundational attempts to ground morality, while others consider that these should be complemented with a realistic basis if they are not to become empty formalisms.
The most immediate aim of this paper is to consider to what extent the criticisms exerted from such realist fronts on Discourse Ethics are compelling. To this purpose I will focus, on the one hand, on H. Putnam works, and on the other, on C. Lafont’s proposal. I will conclude that Discourse Ethics can resist the demands to make concessions, or convert, to some moral realism on both fronts.
Finally, I will address the initial question, and consider in more general terms to which extent the strategies observed by the accounted positions serve the foundational purpose.
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