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dc.contributor.authorMorales, Antonio J
dc.date.accessioned2014-04-22T09:46:49Z
dc.date.available2014-04-22T09:46:49Z
dc.date.created2014
dc.date.issued2014-04-22
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10630/7417
dc.description.abstractQRE adds errors to human decisions, keeping the consistency of beliefs and decisions. The stochastic generalization via a logistic choice rule of the Nash equilibrium has been shown to have two appealing features: (i) its comparative statics properties are in some cases more intuitive than for the standard NE, and (ii) it explains experimental data that are consistent with intuition but are not predicted by a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we show that level k model, much simpler in terms of rationality requirements, reproduces the same comparative statics and offers predictions close to the logit QRE within the class of games with the local payoff propertyes_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipUniversidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech.es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectToma de decisiones (Estadística)es_ES
dc.subject.otherBounded rationalityes_ES
dc.titleAn equivalence theorem for LQRE and level-k and one intuitive contradictiones_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectes_ES
dc.centroFacultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresarialeses_ES
dc.relation.eventtitleIMEBESSes_ES
dc.relation.eventplaceOxfordes_ES
dc.relation.eventdate10 Abril 2014es_ES


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